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JPRS-UMA-87-032

28 MAY 1987

USSR REPORT  
MILITARY AFFAIRS

MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

No 1, January 1987

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language monthly journal VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL.

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## ROLE OF MILITARY HISTORY DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 87 (signed to press 23 Dec 86) pp 3-12

[Editorial: "Military History Work -- On a Level of Today's Requirements"; published under the rubric "Decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress in Life"]

[Text] Our nation has entered the new year of 1987 and the 70th anniversary of the Great Socialist Revolution. The 7 decades of the great revolution which are being triumphantly celebrated by the Soviet people are a significant interval in the history of mankind. These were years of titanic labor by a people who once and for all threw off the burden of exploitation, poverty and lack of rights and who are moving confidently toward a communist future.

In our days the Soviet people and the men of the Army and Navy, in being closely united around the Communist Party and its Central Committee, with unprecedented enthusiasm are working on carrying out the program of accelerated socioeconomic development for the nation and moving forward in all major areas.

In carrying out plans for the improvement of Soviet society, our people constantly remember that as long as the danger exists of the initiating of aggressive wars and conflicts by imperialism, it is essential to strengthen the defense might of the USSR, to build up national security and maintain the constant readiness of the Armed Forces to defeat any aggressor.

One of the components ensuring a necessary level of combat capability and readiness for the Soviet Armed Forces is military history science which should take an active part in carrying out defense tasks. A study of the past from the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism provides dependable answers to many urgent questions of modern times.

An analysis of the historical past is also an essential element in theory and a method by which new theoretical conclusions are elaborated, as was pointed out in the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Journal KOMMUNIST." We must work for an organic unity of the tasks of investigating history with the tasks of analyzing modern times and a look to the future, we must turn to the past, in using Lenin's words, "from the viewpoint of what tomorrow or the day after will require for our policy,"(1) and we must shift the center of

gravity "not so much to describing what we experienced as to those indications of experience which we have gained and should gain for our direct practical activity." (3) Military history is an inseparably component part of the history of the fatherland. It persuasively shows the unstinting struggle of many generations for the liberty and independence of our motherland. The heroism and the steadfastness of the men of the revolution and their readiness to make a self-sacrifice and endure any hardships for the sake of victory over the enemy presently inspire the entire world.

The traditions established during the period of the Civil War of a wholehearted struggle for our motherland became an inexhaustible source of courage, steadfastness and heroism for the Soviet people during the years of the Great Patriotic War. "In the flames of the eternal fire," pointed out the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev in his speech, "of the magnificent memorials and humble obelisks, in the works of literature and art, in the hearts of the contemporaries and our successors will remain forever the memory of the immortal feats of those who were the first to go over to the assault, who blocked the firing slits with their body, who carried out a mid-air ram, who threw themselves with grenades under tanks, who in sailor's jackets closed with the enemy in hand-to-hand combat, who sank enemy ships, who derailed trains, who courageously fought on an invisible front, who stood to the death on the battlefield...." (4)

The heroic path followed by the Communist Party, by the Soviet people and their Armed Forces and their revolutionary, combat and labor traditions are the foundation of military patriotic indoctrination.

Military history plays an important role in shaping the ideology and awareness of the Soviet military and in determining their attitude in life. It actively influences not only the mind but also the feelings of a person and makes it possible to correctly understand the daily current of military service in the past, the present and the future.

The military experience of the past, in being a sound base for the development of modern military affairs, makes it possible to disclose patterns and trends in military art and, in the apt expression of V.I. Lenin, "to look at each question from the viewpoint of how a certain phenomenon in history arose, what main stages this phenomenon went through in its development and from the viewpoint of this development see what the given thing has now become." (5)

A knowledge of military history enriches the military personnel with experience in organizing and conducting combat operations and this is particularly important under present-day conditions, when a new generation of generals and officers has replaced the participants of the wars. The importance of military history also has increased because the tasks of training and indoctrinating the personnel have been complicated by the arming of the Armed Forces with complex combat equipment and with the greater demands placed upon the combat readiness of the troops.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War, as was pointed out by the USSR Minister of Defense, MSU S.L. Sokolov, in his speech, in being engendered by the mass heroism of the Soviet people and by their military and labor feat, is

a most important source of military patriotic indoctrination of the Armed Forces personnel and the workers of our nation at present. It has not lost its importance for the future. In order to carry out their purpose of protecting the motherland, the Army and Navy should constantly study tenaciously and intensely, making skillful use of available experience in this.

Military history has been and remains a sphere of most acute ideological struggle. Bourgeois ideologists have not abandoned the attempts to distort the reasons for the outbreak of World War II and they falsify its results and lessons. This has been done for the single purpose of rehabilitating imperialism, removing its responsibility for initiating the war, for justifying its present-day aggressive policy and casting a shadow on the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces, for eradicating the truth of the world-historical feat of our people from the memory of others, for distorting and playing down the crucial role of the Soviet Union in the defeat of Nazism and for undermining the constantly growing authority of the USSR on the international scene.

All of this requires a decisive improvement in military history work, the abandoning of obsolete forms and methods, the reaching of new frontiers of knowledge and their effective realization in practice.

A greater ideological and indoctrinational role for military history and greater importance for the latter in improving the skill of the military personnel place special demands on it.

A high ideological level, truthfulness, logicalness, the strict observance of the Leninist principles of party loyalty and a correct historical approach are the most important and requisite conditions for all those who commence military history research.

Soviet military historians can rightfully be proud of their most significant achievements among which a prominent place is held by the 12-volume "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], the 8-volume "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], "Voyenny entsiklopedicheskiy slovar" [Military Encyclopedic Dictionary], "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna 1941-1945" [The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], an encyclopedia, and the works "Ideologicheskaya rabota v Vooruzhennykh Silakh SSSR" [Ideological Work in the USSR Armed Forces], "Stroitelstvo armiy yevropeyskikh stran sotsialisticheskogo sodruzhestva 1949-1980" [Organizational Development of the Armies of the European Socialist Commonwealth Countries of 1949-1980], as well as textbooks for military academies, schools and other works.

However, regardless of these successes, military history science still is not fully helping to carry out the tasks confronting the Soviet Armed Forces.

Let us say frankly that the subject and scope of the military history works and dissertations being written in a number of instances are divorced from the practical needs of the Army and Navy. They do not contain a profound, concrete analysis of the experience of the commanders and staffs in preparing

and conducting combat operations or controlling and commanding the troops during the years of the Great Patriotic War, and they little reflect the experience of operational and combat training in the postwar period. The scientific theoretical level of certain military history works is not sufficiently high (they are predominantly of a descriptive nature). Very rarely is research published devoted to the pertinent problems of combined-arms tactics of the tactics of the Armed Services and branches of troops. In treating the questions of the history of military art, the authors at times endeavor to follow the well-trodden path, they describe widely known operations of the Great Patriotic War and significantly less the experience of local wars, military conflicts and particularly the postwar exercises and maneuvers. Often works have been written in a dry, formal language with factual errors and distortions.

In the plans of scientific work, frequently chief attention is paid not to elaborating the most important military history problems the importance of which is determined by modern tasks confronting the Armed Forces but rather to publishing books, teaching aids and monographs many of which to a significant degree repeat previously written works. The researchers often avoid the most acute problems. For example, instead of a profound scientific analysis of the approach and initial periods of the last war and a thorough objective assessment of our political, economic, diplomatic and military measures to prepare the nation to repel aggression, virtually each book and article published on this question describes the same reasons for our temporary setbacks at the start of the war.

The 27th CPSU Congress gave great attention to increasing the role of social sciences in the life of our society. Military historians have much to do in order to improve the quality and effectiveness of military history research and to bring it into complete conformity to the demands made on modern military science and on increasing the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The program documents of the 27th Party Congress, the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Journal KOMMUNIST" and the materials of the All-Union Conference of Heads of the Social Sciences Chairs have pointed to the necessity of a reorganization of social sciences. "At present," stated the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev in his speech, "social sciences are confronted with the task of overcoming their isolation from the needs of life. We urgently require a decisive about-face on the entire social sciences front to practice...when the party has called for thinking and working in a new way, it is essential in many areas to reorganize the education and indoctrination process in a new manner."(6)

In this context the role of history, including military, increases significantly in indoctrinating the Soviet people and the young defenders of the motherland using the examples from the heroic past of our people.

The strength of the effect of historical knowledge and historical memory is extraordinarily great. During the difficult time of the Great Patriotic War the appeal of the Communist Party to the people's historic past and to the glorious names of Aleksandr Nevskiy, Dmitriy Donskoy, Kuzma Minin, Aleksandr



Suvorov and Mikhail Kutuzov helped strengthen the combat morale of the motherland's defenders. The feat of ancestors who defended the honor and independence of the nation was continued by the heroic defenders of the Brest Fortress, Sevastopol, Odessa, Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, Minsk, Novorossiysk, Smolensk and other cities.

All public education bodies, the mass information media and film must provide sound knowledge on history, including military, and widen the viewpoint. From childhood we remember the most vivid events which were described to us in the family and school, which we heard about over the radio, saw in the cinema, theater or museum, or learned about from artistic literature. As a result, all of this creates a foundation of historical awareness and thought on which is formed the citizen who is the patriot of his motherland, its defender and convinced internationalist.

Officers, generals and admirals gain sound military history knowledge in academies and schools. As a rule, the educational process in them is supplied with the requisite aids and educational studies and teaching equipment is widely employed. Also effective are film lectures on the major operations of the Great Patriotic War and exercises with students and officer candidates in museums and rooms of military glory.

Many faculties carry out extensive and effective work to seek out ways to further increase the level of military history training. Thus, in the Military Academy imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy, they have successfully introduced into educational practice the method of studying the development of Soviet military art from the operations of the Great Patriotic War and from individual, most important problems in strategy and operational art. A comprehensive military history operations problem "The Work of a Commander and Headquarters Body of an Operational Field Force in Organizing an Operation and Leading the Troops in the Course of the Conduct of Combat Operations" (from the experience of the Iasi-Kishinev Operation of the Great Patriotic War) has been worked out and is being employed with the students. Quiz home assignments are widely employed for the students as well as the systematic testing of knowledge and the effectiveness of their independent work. The teaching of the course of the history of military art is problem-oriented. In the instruction they also consider the particular features of the future work of the graduates.

At the same time, in certain military schools, the study of military history and military history work often come down to the giving of planned lectures and the holding of seminars. Here individual superiors underestimate the importance of teaching military history disciplines for shaping and developing the operational-strategic and tactical viewpoint and for raising the military skill of the officer personnel and they do not fully realize their possibilities in indoctrinating the students and officer candidates in the heroic traditions of the past.

At a number of the military schools, the teaching of "Military History" and "The History of Military (Naval) Art" is chronological and not of a problem approach and frequently the academies duplicate the subjects making up the curriculum of the military schools. Little consideration is given to the

specialization in training the students and officer candidates of the Armed Services, the branches of troops and special troops while a number of officers teaching the military history discipline do not have special training. The opportunities for the faculty to carry out scientific research are not fully realized. The plans for scientific work at certain academies do not have a section for military history work.

It is perfectly obvious that for the students of the military academies and the officer candidates of military schools the study of the history of wars and military art is very important. There is no need to prove how great its role is in the ideological tempering of future commanders and political workers.

All the more lamentable are the existing flaws in its instruction including: the mechanical transfer of school methods of instruction to military schools, timidity in seeking out and employing new procedures and forms for presenting the material, weakness in the educational preparation of individual instructors and the low level of their lecture skill.

A great deal depends upon the clear orientation and organization of the officer candidates and students to independent work and upon how closely the content of the military history course is related to the requirements and tasks of military art at the present stage.

We must instill in the students of the military academies and the officer candidates of the military schools not only a taste for studying military history and provide profound knowledge in this area but also teach them to employ this knowledge for the indoctrination and training of subordinates.

Analysis indicates that many servicemen satisfy their interest in the past by reading artistic and documentary works on military history and military themes.

The nation has developed many works which have gained public recognition. However, from the standpoint of the high demands of the 27th CPSU Congress, as was pointed out at a meeting with the leaders of the creative unions and organizations and the leading workers in literature and art by the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Army Gen A.D. Lizichev, it is essential to check where there are shortcomings, where the opportunities are not sufficiently employed, in what areas one can expect a maximum return in indoctrinating the soldier, the patriot and the citizen using the means of literature and art.

There are also shortcomings in such an area as the artistic assimilation and correct treatment of our heroic history.

Many works are still being published the authors of which have a very arbitrary approach to historical facts and distort the true picture of events. Often the tragic aspect of the war, the sacrifices, hardships and destruction suffered by our nation are put foremost. This is done to the detriment of the truly epic. In individual works one feels innuendos of abstract passivism and a condemnation of any war, regardless of its class nature and causes.(7)

These flaws are largely explained by the insufficient military history viewpoint of the authors, by the poor creative ties of the writers and artists with military historians and personnel of the Army and Navy as well as by the incompetence of the critics.

It is the duty of the writers and journalists to show the heroism and skill of the Soviet military in an objective, persuasive and vivid manner. The combat experience of the frontline veterans and their military deeds must find a worthy place in the practice and training of the personnel.

Military history work in the troops is an inseparable part of the work of the commanders, the staffs, the political bodies and other headquarters bodies in training and indoctrinating the personnel and should be conducted in accord with the tasks of the troops. Here it is essential to widely employ military history works, archival materials, the exhibits of museums and rooms of combat glory, as well as military memoir literature. Of great importance are meetings with veterans of the Great Patriotic War.

The military districts and fleets have gained rich experience in carrying out military history work. Thus, the Pacific Fleet has published a document which analyzes the state of military history work in the fleet in recent years and sets out new tasks.

On the fleet staff there is the position of fleet historiographer. In the formations, on the ships and in the units these duties are carried out by non-T/O historiographers appointed by the orders of the appropriate commanders.

By a decision of the command the Main Staff of the Air Defense Troops has set up a non-T/O council for coordinating the military history research while on the staffs, military academies and at the schools there are non-T/O military history groups.

In organizing and carrying out military history work, the commanders and chiefs have endeavored to take into account the particular features of the troop positions, the physico-geographic conditions, a knowledge of the probable enemy, the specific features of its military policy and doctrine as well as the specific combat experience in a given theater during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

Instructive in this regard is the work done by the staffs of the Far Eastern and Transbaykal Military Districts and under their leadership they are widely studying the experience of the conduct of combat operations to defeat militaristic Japan and, in particular, the breaking through of enemy fortified areas, the conduct of an offensive by mechanized and tank formations and units, the extensive employment of maneuver and raids as part of the units and formations and the all-round support for the conduct of combat operations under the conditions of a mountain-desert and mountain-tayga terrain.

Materials on this subject have been widely employed in working out command-staff exercises as well as exercises involving the troops. The generals, admirals and officers have responded with gratitude about the military history



conferences held on the subjects "Amphibious Operations During the Period of World War II" and "Preparation and Execution of an Offensive Operation by the Army of the Second Far Eastern Front in Cooperation With the Forces of the Amur Naval Flotilla in the Manchurian Offensive Operation of 1945." Here they worked out the ways for the fullest realization of the experience of the Great Patriotic War in the process of training and indoctrinating the personnel.

An absolute majority of the commanders and political workers realizes that military history work has an enormous impact on the minds and hearts of the men, and influences the level of their operational, combat and political training. The experience of the Great Patriotic War, local wars, the postwar exercises and maneuvers is that basis on which the tasks of today are set and carried out. However, an analysis of the state of military history work indicates that it is not on the proper level everywhere. Certain leaders themselves do not fully understand its importance, essence and content, they do not have the skills in its organization, conduct and the use of results in improving the quality of operational and combat training and they put off this important undertaking onto the political bodies, the creative collectives of the museums, the rooms of combat glory and the veteran councils.

Unfortunately, there have been instances when the planning documents do not reflect the specific tasks of military history work, the procedure for its organizing, conduct, or the employment of results and testing. In the system of commander training, the experience of the Great Patriotic War, the local wars, the fighting in Afghanistan as well as other military history questions is studied extremely rarely and has been introduced very timidly into the practical operational and combat training.

An analysis of certain exercises has shown that the experience gained in the past is not always employed. Why, for example, in working on such a method of fighting as the encirclement do they not describe thoroughly how this was carried out at Minsk in the course of the 1944 Belorussian Operation? There could be great benefit from this.

The following fact shows the value of past experience. In the course of the exercise Kavkaz-85 [Caucasus-85], the subunits skillfully fought for a mountain pass, they crossed a river and worked out the questions of cooperation. Success was aided by the fact that in the period of preparing for the exercise, its leader demanded that the officers make a careful study of the combat experience gained during the years of the Great Patriotic War in fighting in mountainous and semi-desert terrain and give some thought to how this could be employed in the given situation. In particular, it was recommended that they examine the most instructive features of the fighting for the liberation of the Caucasus. The conducted exercise showed that military history experience provides much that is of value for training the staffs, units and subunits.

It is disconcerting that the histories of the formations and units have not been worked out in all the districts. The historic books (journals) are put out irregularly and they do not always take up the results of combat and political training, the socialist competition or important events in the life of the troops.

Leadership over the military history and the monitoring of its state and direction by certain commanders and staffs are carried out sporadically. The questions of military history work in the military councils and meetings are not always discussed directly. In summing up the final inspections of operational, combat and political training the state of military history work is often not checked and graded.

In order to raise the role of military history to the proper height, to increase the level and effectiveness of military history work, that is, to bring it into accord with modern demands, it is essential, in our view, to take a decisive turn toward the real life of the Army and Navy and to widely use military history as an important, constantly operating factor for training and indoctrinating the troops and for the operational and command training of officer personnel.

The problems confronting military history science must be closely linked to the present-day tasks of the Army and Navy, they must be reflected in the plans of operational, combat and political training and considered in carrying out the practical tasks of combat training and the indoctrination of the personnel.

Planning must be based upon the elaboration of specific problems the solution to which is of the greatest importance for military science generally and military history, in particular. The main efforts should be directed precisely at the elaboration of urgent problems and not at publishing various works dealing only with partial questions and standing on the sidelines of the general tasks being carried out by military science. Among such problems we must put primarily the problem of combat and mobilizational readiness (the ways for carrying it out on the eve of the war and in the postwar period), the conversion of the armed forces from a peacetime status to a wartime one, the strategic deployment of the armed forces from the experience of world and local wars, initial operations, strategic and operational reserves (the experience of establishing and employing) and so forth. These can and should be significantly more in number but the demand for the problems being worked out remains one: to serve the interests of today and to provide specific recommendations for the practical employment of military history in the Army and Navy.

In continuing to study the experience of the Great Patriotic War, more attention must be paid to investigating local wars and conflicts as well as the postwar stage in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces.

There are various ways to carry out the designated tasks. But whatever particular or general problems the military historians are solving, all of these should be united by a desire to bring the end result to the troops so that the fruits of the scientific work be employed by the commanders and political workers.

In speaking about the importance of studying the past, it is very important to draw attention to the relativeness of the distinction between history and modern times. In actuality, the exercise completed today tomorrow becomes the

property of historians and generally each passing day constantly is added to the subject of historical study and cognition. Here the past is a step to the present and from it to tomorrow's tasks.

"In history there are no direct analogies," emphasized the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev, "but similar situations do arise and for this reason the fruitful experience of the past is so valuable and instructive for us." (8) The military historians must make an abrupt turn from a chronological investigation of events to their thorough analysis and to disclosing the patterns and trends in the development of military art; they must pay more attention to lessons and conclusions. Here the tone, naturally, must be set by the Military History Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense which coordinates military history research. Undoubtedly, its co-workers proceed correctly if, along with creating fundamental works, they focus their efforts on seeking out practical recommendations in resolving the urgent problems of further strengthening Soviet defense capability, military theory and practice, the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces. It is essential to improve work in generalizing the experience of local wars and the postwar development of the Army and Navy and increase the demands placed upon the elaboration and reviewing of military history works.

It is important that the benefit of a scientific work be determined not only by the quantity of scientific research works or publications, not by the volume of elaborated monographs and reports, but rather by the actual scientific achievements, by the useful conclusions and by the putting of new documents and facts into scientific circulation. For this reason, there must be a stricter approach to defining the military history subjects of the candidate and doctoral dissertations, we must disclose all the most valuable in them and more actively employ this in troop practices. Along with publishing major works, it is also important to turn out in mass editions series of small format books and pamphlets on Russian military history which in an interesting and accessible manner would describe the heroic past of our motherland, the combat skill, valor and courage of the Soviet troops both during the period of the war as well as in peacetime.

It is the duty of the publishers to see to it that each book and pamphlet without fail be marked not only by an accuracy of exposition but also by clarity, persuasiveness of arguments as well as newness of historical facts and documents. As yet there are not enough such works. At the same time, a large number of books is piling up which are not in demand among military readers. This is a "contribution" of not only Voenizdat but also many other publishing houses which often duplicate the published military history literature, without coordinating the advisability of its publishing.

A fundamental improvement in military history work in the Army and Navy is closely tied to the level of military history training of the students of the military academies and the officer candidates of the military schools. In the process of their instruction it is essential to pay more attention to studying the experience of actual troop leadership, the work methods of the commanders in organizing combat and troop command during the years of the Great Patriotic War as well as in the course of major exercises and maneuvers of the postwar period, and to analyzing the lessons of local wars and the experience of the

fighting in Afghanistan as well as to the method of organizing and conducting military history work in the troops. There must not be a shortening of the training time assigned to studying military history disciplines and we must move from a description of events to a problem-focused study of the history of military art.

The need has arisen for the military schools of the Armed Services to create a textbook "Voyennaya istoriya" [Military History] and to update and publish new map diagrams, teaching aids, films and film strips on the main subjects of the courses "Military History" and "History of Military (Naval) Art" considering the changes in the curricula as well as illustrated albums and posters on the history of the development of weapons and combat equipment.

In working to increase the effectiveness of the system of military history education, it is essential above all to pay attention to improving the teaching of the course of the history of wars and military art. It is essential to raise the prestige of the profession of "military historian," to indoctrinate the qualities of a political fighter in the instructors and increase their professional and educational skills.

Directly linked to this is the problem of the quality of the curricula and textbooks on military history. It is important to escape from the dispassionateness and dryness in the exposition of material characteristic of some of our textbooks and make them more vivid, persuasive and informative. It is essential to increase the demands placed upon the authors and author collectives of military history works and on the quality of articles published in the periodic press.

The military history work arising on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War must be increased and it must be carried out in a close unity with the instruction process so that it influence the development of the patriotic, international awareness of the men and the improving of their combat skill as well as contribute to their profound understanding of military duty. In this work, fuller use must be made of the military history works, archival materials and films on military history subjects, the exhibits of museums and rooms of military glory, lectures, reports, conferences, meetings with war veterans and trips to combat sites.

Those commanders and superiors who do not pay proper attention to military history work must be convinced that a knowledge of military history helps a majority of the generals, admirals and officers to compensate for a lack of personal combat experience and it plays an inestimable role in the professional development of a commander and political worker.

The military archives provide great help in the work of historians. In the future these must improve the working through of documentary materials, the selection and preparation of them for publication, they must help in every possible way in studying new documents, improve the organization of their use in the interests of military history and reference work and make a wider practice of the periodic publishing of new archival documents in the military publishing bodies. We must seek such a situation that the military history

literature exists not only in the units and formations but also in the battalions, companies and other subunits.

Responsible tasks confront the military historians on the occasion of the approaching jubilee in the life of the Soviet people, the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The pages of newspapers and magazines must publish a series of materials which thoroughly show the diverse experience of our Leninist party and people in socialist construction, having focused attention on the still unresolved tasks and on the relationship of the ideals of October and the current course of the party. Indoctrination by history is an excellent school of civics and courage, or loyalty to the people, motherland and the Communist Party. It is essential in every possible way to assist in seeing to it that all Soviet soldiers pass through this school in an effective manner.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. V.I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 38, p 166.
2. [Not in text.]
3. V.I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 39, p 342.
4. M.S. Gorbachev, "Bessmertnyy podvig sovetskogo naroda" [The Immortal Feat of the Soviet People], Moscow, Politizdat, 1984, p 4.
5. V.I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 39, p 67.
6. PRAVDA, 2 October 1986.
7. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 7 June 1986.
8. "Perestroyka neotlozhna, ona kasayetsya vsekh i vo vsem" [Reorganization Is Imperative, It Concerns Everyone and Everything], Moscow, Politizdat, 1986, p 33.

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ANALYSIS OF CAUSES OF INCONCLUSIVENESS OF CERTAIN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

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[Article by Col B.N. Petrov, candidate of historical sciences, published under the rubric "Soviet Military Art"]

[Text] During the years of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Armed Forces gained diverse combat experience in organizing and conducting offensive operations, a majority of which was marked by originality of concept, by the effectiveness of the thrusts against the enemy, by a decisiveness of troop actions and by effective results. Such operations represent classic examples of Soviet military art and are a dependable foundation for developing modern military theory and practice.

Numerous victorious operations by the Soviet troops have been studied and described in our military history literature most completely and they above all had a decisive impact on the course and outcome of the armed struggle. However, a study of combat experience should not only disclose factors, conditions and causes for our victories but also show the circumstances which unfavorably influence the outcome of combat operations and also caution against mistakes.

The reasons for the inconclusiveness of offensive operations can be reduced to two interrelated groups. The first encompasses the objective economic and strategic conditions for conducting military operations and the second is the subjective factors.

The main objective reason for the inconclusiveness of a majority of the offensive operations during the first period of the war was the overall shortage of men and weapons in the fronts and in the armies and caused by the high losses suffered by the Armed Forces during the first months of military actions. During the initial period of the war, out of the 170 Soviet divisions in the five border military districts, 28 were put completely out of action and over 70 were deprived of one-half of their strength in personnel and combat equipment. Around 200 dumps with fuel, ammunition and weapons remained on enemy captured territory.(1) Moreover, our troops often had to commence an offensive immediately after heavy defensive fighting and sometimes

in the course of this with a shortage of time for preparing the offensive. Thus, in November 1941, in the course of repelling enemy thrusts, offensive operations at Rostov and Tikhvin were organized and carried out. Without a pause, simultaneously with the conduct of a fierce defensive engagement, the counteroffensive at Moscow commenced in December 1941. Under these conditions, by the start of the offensive it was impossible to establish a substantial overall superiority over the enemy either within the boundaries of the main strategic sectors or in the zones of the fronts. For this reason the offensive operations during the first period of the war were usually carried out with a relative equality in forces, with the poor technical equipping of our troops and a limited amount of ammunition for all types of weapons. While in terms of the number of rifle troops our fronts often surpassed the enemy by 1.2-2-fold, in terms of the number of tanks and aviation in a majority of instances superiority was on the enemy's side.

In line with the significant losses suffered and the reorganization carried out for this reason in July 1941, the fire capability of the rifle troops declined sharply while the armored and mechanized troops did not have a sufficient amount of large tank and mechanized formations capable of launching powerful thrusts against the enemy on the offensive. At the same time the enemy, in possessing tank divisions with 150-200 tanks each, (2) used them on a massed basis for parrying the thrusts of our troops.

In 1941, the artillery also underwent major organizational changes. The high losses and the impossibility of quickly replenishing the materiel were the reason that the brigades of antitank artillery were broken up and in their place were regiments of four-battery composition with 16 weapons in each. With the conversion to reduced TOE, the fire capabilities of the cannon and howitzer regiments of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command [RVGK] were reduced by 2-fold. The artillery which existed in limited amounts in the fronts and armies during the period of artillery softening up did not ensure the dependable neutralization of even the then weak enemy defenses.

One of the main reasons for the inconclusiveness of the offensive operations during the first period of the war was the sharp shortage of ammunition felt by the troops. "Probably it is hard to believe," recalled MSU G.K. Zhukov, "that we had to set a rate of expenditure...of ammunition at one or two rounds per gun per day. And this, note, was in a period of an offensive!" (3)

Industry did not fully satisfy the demand for ammunition. Thus, from December 1941 through March 1942, some 4,690,000 76-mm shells were spent, while over this time industry delivered only 3,179,000. An analogous situation developed in the expenditure of certain other types of ammunition. (4) In 1942, the shortage of ammunition was the greatest during the entire war. The shortage of ammunition led to a situation where individual calibers of guns and mortars in the course of an offensive were virtually not used and as a result of this the enemy's fire plan was not neutralized and our troops, in suffering great losses, did not achieve the proper success.

The theory of Soviet operational art demanded that for conducting offensive operations on the sector of the main thrust groupings should be established which in terms of their forces would surpass the defending enemy troops by 2-

or 3-fold and ensure the achieving of the goals of the offensive operations. However, in the first period of the war, this was impossible.

The shortage of men and weapons, the wide zones of advance, the complexity of the situation and the extremely limited times in which offensive operations had to be organized caused the weak massing of men and weapons on the sector of the main thrusts during the period of the offensive operations of 1941 and the start of 1942. Even a significant narrowing of the zones of advance of the armies fighting on the sector of the planned thrusts did not ensure the establishing of high densities of men and weapons on the breakthrough sectors. In a majority of the operations these densities were: 1-2 rifle battalions, 20-23 guns and mortars and 2 or 3 tanks per kilometer of front. (5) Here 50-60 percent of the artillery concentrated on the breakthrough sectors was made up of guns and mortars up to 76-mm caliber (we should note that from 1943, the artillery systems of such caliber were no longer taken into account in the artillery density).

Nevertheless, in a majority of the offensive operations conducted, for example, in the winter of 1941-1942, the thrusts by our troops, as a rule, ended with the breakthrough of the enemy's tactical defensive zone and coming out in the operational depth. Under these conditions, the achieving of the ultimate aims of the operations depended upon the high rate of advance and by the prompt building up of the force of the thrust on the main sectors by committing mobile groups, second echelons and reserves to the engagement.

However, due to the poor motorization of the rifle troops, their rate of advance was low (not more than 4-6 km a day) and did not ensure the rapid coming out in the flank and rear of the main enemy groupings. This made it possible for the enemy to retreat into its defenses, to shift reserves to the battlefield and put up organized resistance on new lines which the advancing troops were forced to break through with brief preparations.

The fronts and sometimes the armies did not have second echelons, their reserves were few and could not have a decisive impact upon exploiting the success. In line with this the reserves received by the fronts and armies and the drafts of recruits were often committed to battle piecemeal without a pause and without sufficient preparation and this significantly reduced their effective employment. Only at times were mobile groups consisting of cavalry formations reinforced with tank brigades and ski battalions established for outflanking the defending Nazi troops or for capturing important objectives in the enemy rear. However, their commitment to the breach was not sufficiently supported in engineer terms. Also weak were the fire neutralization of the enemy and the support of advancing troops by aviation. The insufficient number of tanks and motor transport reduced the maneuverability and limited the possibility of actions by the mobile groups in the operational depth. Moreover, the cavalry suffered great losses from enemy air and tank strikes while the artillery units attached to the mobile groups did not have enough mechanical traction. All of this prevented the mobile groups from developing a rapid offensive and to separate from the first echelons of the combined-arms armies, as was the case, for example, on the Western Front in the counteroffensive at Moscow.



## Basic Indicators for Certain Incomplete Offensive

No. Operations (Fronts, Dates of Execution)	Aim of Operation Set by Directive
1 Kalinin (Kalinin Front, 5 Dec 41-7 Jan 42)	Surround and destroy enemy troops in Kalinin area as well as come out in rear of Klin enemy grouping to assist in destroying it by Western Front (TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 132-A, inv. 2642, file 30, sheet 108)
2 Sychev-Vyazma (Kalinin Front, 8 Jan-20 Apr 42)	To defeat enemy grouping in Rzhev area, to outflank from northwest main forces of German Army Group Center in cooperation with Western Front to surround and defeat it (TsAMO, folio 132-A, inv. 2642, file 31, sheet 1)
3 Toropets-Kholm (NW, Kalinin Fronts, 9 Jan-6 Feb 42)	Defeat Ostashkov enemy grouping and, in deeply enveloping the German Army Group Center from west, to assist in its defeat by Western Front (TsAMO, folio 132-A, inv. 2642, file 42, sheets 6-7)
4 Barenkovo-Lozovskiy (SW and S Fronts, 18 Jan-31 Jan 42)	By thrust of adjacent wings of 2 fronts, to break enemy defenses and, continuing offensive to Zaporozhye, come out in rear of Donbass-Taganrog enemy grouping. After defeat of enemy 17th Army to take Kharkov and Krasnograd (TsAMO, folio 229, inv. 164, file 106, sheet 6)
5 Kharkov (SW Front, 12 May-19 May 42)	By concentric thrust of 6th and 28th Armies to surround enemy Kharkov grouping and take Kharkov (TsAMO, folio 251, inv. 646, file 145, sheets 189-190)
6 Rzhev-Sychevo (W, Kalinin Fronts, 30 Jul-23 Aug 42)	To launch main thrust against Rzhev and auxiliary along left bank of Volga to Zubtsov, to clear the enemy from this bank of the river and take Rzhev, (TsAMO, folio 132-A, inv. 2642, file 32, sheet 143; folio 208, inv. 2513, file 218, sheets 101-102)

**Note.** In compiling table, in addition to documents of TsAMO, the following were used: "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vols 4, 5; "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vols 1, 4, 7, 8.

# Operations in the First Period of the War

Actual Results of Operation	Scope of Operation					
	Planned			Actual		
	a	b	c	a	b	c
Did not succeed fully in carrying out task to defeat enemy 9th Army and take Rzhev	150	23	6.5	60-120	33	3-4
As a result of enemy counterstrike at start of Feb 42, 29th Army was surrounded. Attempts by front in March and Apr to continue offensive and carry out set tasks unsuccessful	130	18	8	80-90	100	0.8-0.9
Moving up of enemy reserves at start of Feb halted advance of enemy troops and they went over to offensive on line of Velikiye Luki, Velizh, Belyy	350	30	12	250	29	8.5
Enemy, reinforcing grouping at base of breakthrough, organized stubborn resistance. As a result, tasks of SW and S Fronts not completely carried out. Kharkov and Krasnograd remained in enemy hands	250-300	23-25	10-12	90-100	14	7-8
Enemy by attacking flanks of advancing groupings able to surround them. Soviet troops suffered heavy losses in personnel and equipment. Operation ended with failure	50-70	15-18	3-4	25-50	8	
Assault groupings of fronts involved in extended fighting to repel enemy counterstrikes. Impossible to liberate Rzhev and create bridgehead in its area on right bank of Volga	50	13	4	30-45	24	1.5-2.2

Key: a--Depth (km)  
b--Time (days)  
c--Rate (km/day)

Thus, the exploitation of the initial success of the operations was carried out slowly, the enemy did not suffer a decisive defeat and subsequently had to be forced from the held lines. The offensive assumed the form of extended bloody fighting and gradually died down before the carrying out of the set tasks. The basic indicators of certain incompleting offensive operations during the first period of the war are shown in the table.

The subjective factors for the incomplete fulfillment of the tasks of an offensive involved chiefly the lack of experience in our command personnel in organizing offensive actions, the underestimating of the enemy and the overestimating of our own forces as well as shortcomings in troop leadership in certain command elements.

On the eve of the war, the commanders and staffs were steadily mastering what at that time was the advanced theory of an operation in depth. The troops had received the draft of the new Field Manual (PU-39). However, they had not succeeded in mastering its provisions in actual operational and combat training. It must also not be forgotten that at the end of the 1930s and directly prior to the war, many young military leaders were appointed to responsible posts in the army and they did not have sufficient experience in the control of large operational field forces and under the difficult conditions of the commenced war did not always take correct decisions.

In analyzing the experience of the first offensive operations, Hq SHC [Headquarters Supreme High Command] in the Directive Letter of 10 January 1941 pointed out that the low rate of breaking through the enemy tactical defensive zone was to be explained not only by the shortage of men and weapons but also by the dispersed actions on separate sectors and by the employment of artillery for just preparatory fire. Headquarters demanded that the commanders of the fronts and armies on the main sectors establish strong assault groups, ensuring thereby a decisive superiority of forces over the enemy. The strength of an army assault group was set at three-four divisions and an assault group for a front should be several armies. (6)

The basic provisions set out in the Directive Letter were not new in Soviet military art but they were formulated in accord with the specific conditions of the armed combat and required a certain time for assimilation. Under the difficult conditions of the situation, when initiative was in enemy hands and it was essential not only to organize the conduct the offensive but also think constantly of keeping firm hold on the entire zone, not every commander was capable of abandoning the even distribution of forces in order to concentrate the predominant part of them on the sector of the main thrust. This was the main flaw in organizing and conducting the offensive operations during the first period of the war.

Often the commanders and staffs incorrectly assessed the situation, chiefly the nature of operations and the enemy's combat capabilities while at the same time overestimating their forces and capabilities.

For example, in conducting the Kharkov Offensive Operation in May 1942, the command of the Southwestern Sector and the Southern Front did not draw correct

conclusions from the report of the military council of the 9th Army on the developing dangerous situation in the area of the Barvenkovo Salient and did not take proper measures to support the flank of the assault grouping. The decision was taken late to halt the offensive in line with the obvious threat of encirclement to the Soviet troops. As a result of the mistakes made, on 23 May in the area of Balakleya, Izyum and Barvenkovo, the enemy succeeded in surrounding a significant troop grouping of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts. The enemy was able to continue its planned offensive into the south of our country.

In the first period of the war, there was sometimes an overstating of the capabilities of our troops in setting their combat tasks. Thus, Hq SHC somewhat overestimated the results of the counteroffensive at Moscow, Tikhvin and Rostov and underestimated the enemy forces and its capability for further resistance. Instead of building up the effort of our troops on the western strategic sector where successful operations were being initiated by the Western and Kalinin Fronts to defeat Army Group Center, major offensive operations were initiated simultaneously on the three most important sectors of the Soviet-German Front and this led to a splitting of the efforts of the operational fronts.

For example, the offensive capabilities of the Western Front were significantly weakened in line with the decision of the Supreme High Command on 21 January 1942 to withdraw the 1st Attack Army from it with the subsequent incorporation of the army in the Northwestern Front.(7) This led to the loss of superiority over the enemy on the main strategic sector and was one of the main reasons for the inconclusiveness of the operation to surround and destroy the Rzhev-Vyazma enemy grouping.

Regardless of the fatigue of the troops by the continuous 2 months of the offensive in the winter of 1941-1942, the Supreme High Command set increased tasks for the fronts. Thus, on 16 February 1942, Hq SHC demanded that the High Command of the Western Sector mobilize all the forces of the Kalinin and Western Fronts to complete the defeat of Army Group Center fighting in the area of Rzhev, Vyazma, Yelnya, and by 5 March reach the line of Olenino, the Dnieper River, Yelnya and further along the Dnieper River to Snopot. Simultaneously the armies on the left wing of the Western Front were to eliminate the enemy grouping in the area of Bolkhov, Zhizdra, Bryansk and liberate Bryansk.(8)

As subsequent events were to show, the fronts of the Western Sector were given excessively difficult tasks. In the course of the offensive, the field forces and formations which had fought a long time without relief, suffered significant losses, without receiving sufficient reinforcements. Thus, the Western Front in January-February 1942 was lacking almost 140,000 men. All of this told negatively on the rate of advance of our troops and provided the enemy with an opportunity to gain time for moving up 12 divisions and 2 security brigades to the front and for establishing a strong defense on the rear lines.(9) The offensive of the Kalinin Front was unsuccessful and on 17 February, the enemy closed the ring of encirclement around the 29th Army which by heavy fighting succeeded in breaking out to link up with the main forces.(10)

The command of the fronts often also set tasks which did not correspond to the effective strength of the armies. Thus, in January 1942, in the course of the Toropets-Kholm Operation, the 3d Attack Army had driven deep into the enemy defenses. In carrying out the main task of capturing Velikiye Luki, the army command at the same time was forced to assign two-thirds of the army's effective strength to cover the exposed flanks. As a result, there were not enough forces to capture Velikiye Luki and the city was liberated only a year later in the course of the Velikiye Luki Operation.

In the offensive operations during the winter of 1941-1942, the commanders of the armies and fronts did not sufficiently study and consider in their planning the system of enemy defenses which had a focal nature. The spaces existing in the defense due to the deep snow cover and an ignorance of the situation were frequently employed by our troops for coming out in the rear of enemy garrisons and launching surprise attacks against them. Thus, a majority of formations from the 34th and 3d Attack Armies of the Northwestern Front during the first days of the Demyansk Operation (January-April 1942) became involved in extended fighting to capture enemy strongpoints. This led to a slowdown in the rate of advance of the troops and ultimately told negatively on the carrying out of the battle tasks.

Due to poorly organized reconnaissance, the commanders of the fronts and armies frequently did not have a clear understanding of the enemy forces and grouping and this led to the taking of incorrect decisions. For example, in assessing the enemy on the eve of the Lyuban Operation (January-April 1942), the commander of the Volkhov Front proceeded from the assumption that weakened by the previous fighting the enemy would be unable to hold out on the left bank of the Volkhov and would be forced to retreat under the thrusts of our troops. For this reason a decision was taken to launch the thrusts along a wide front, without waiting to concentrate all the men and weapons assigned to the front by Hq SHC. At the same time, the Nazi Command was able to reinforce its grouping on this sector and organize a strong defense on the left bank of the Volkhov. As a result, the Lyuban Operation was not completely carried out. (11)

One of the reasons for the inconclusiveness of the offensive operations was the serious shortcomings in troop command. In line with this, Hq SHC as early as September 1941 pointed out: "Decisions are taken using a map without preliminary reconnaissance of the enemy and the terrain.... Cooperation between the branches of troops is organized hurriedly.... The combat readiness of the troops in preparing for the offensive is not checked out and is little considered.... The battle orders are late by a day and more." (12)

However, these shortcomings continued to occur in other operations of the first period of the war. The tasks were often set unspecifically for the armies and the formations, without any indication as to the objectives and lines which should be reached by the end of each day of the operation. For example, during the period of preparing the Demyansk and Lyuban Offensive Operations, the staffs of the fronts and armies did not work out plans for organizing combat and the tasks were issued to the troops very late.

The work in the field of adjusting the plan, organizing fire damage to the enemy, cooperation and other questions was not always carried out. The commanders and leadership of the fronts rarely visited the armies and formations for providing help in preparing for the offensive. Thus, substantial shortcomings in the organization of fire damage to the enemy and cooperation occurred on the Southwestern Front in the Barvenkovo-Lozovskiy Operation. Instead of an artillery offensive, a brief and ineffective artillery softening up was conducted and in the course of this the enemy weapons were not securely neutralized. Cooperation between the infantry and tanks was organized on a map without visiting the field.(13) These and other shortcomings told negatively on the results of the operation. The front's task was not completely carried out.

Hq SHC carefully studied the experience and taught the commanders and staffs the art of preparing and conducting offensive operations, sending to the fronts such experienced military leaders as G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevskiy, N.N. Voronov and others. Orders and directives were issued which generalized combat experience and disclosed shortcomings in troop command, in organizing battle and an operation and which gave practical advice. All of this raised the level of the military skill of the commanders and staffs. They began to assess the situation more thoroughly, to objectively consider the balance of forces, to more boldly mass men and weapons on the sector of the main thrusts and skillfully select breakthrough sectors.

In pointing to the reasons for the successes of the Armed Forces during the second period of the war, MSU G.K. Zhukov correctly mentioned as one of them the increased skill of our command personnel. "...Our higher command personnel over the first period of the war learned a great deal, rethought much and, in going through the difficult school of combating a strong enemy, became masters of operational and tactical art. The command and political personnel and the men of the Red Army using the experience of numerous fierce clashes against enemy troops were strengthened and fully mastered the procedures and methods of combat operations under any situation."(14)

The inconclusiveness of offensive operations occurred not only in the first period of the war but also subsequently. However, the reasons for this were of a somewhat different nature.

Due to the titanic work carried out by the party in reorganizing the national economy to a wartime footing, by mid-1942 the enemy had already been deprived of its advantages in weapons. By the moment of the start of the major engagements on the approaches to Stalingrad and in the Northern Caucasus, the Soviet Armed Forces had basically completed their technical rearming and for many major indicators surpassed the troops of Nazi Germany.(15)

However war, as is known, is a two-sided process. With the greater combat might of our troops, the enemy was forced to alter the nature of its defenses. In March 1943, having finally lost the strategic initiative after the defeat at Stalingrad, the Nazi Command demanded that its troops establish a particularly strong, echeloned defense which in 1944 underwent further development. On the most important sectors, the enemy began erecting



strongpoints and centers of resistance employing reinforced concrete and armored structures.

The enemy concentrated its main efforts on holding the tactical defensive zone, where up to 80 percent of all the forces was deployed. In the event of its breaching, the Nazi troops took up defensive zones in the operational depth using both retreating troops as well as reserves shifted from in depth as well as men and weapons regrouped from other sectors of the front. Every subsequent line in depth was defended at full force. Other strongpoints of the enemy defense were the skillful employment of the terrain and camouflage, the well-organized cooperation of the troops and the extensive maneuvering of men and weapons. Defensive actions were marked by tenacity, steadiness and activeness.

The breaking down and crossing of such defenses, as the experience of the war was to show, required the establishing of at least a 3-fold superiority in men and weapons over the enemy on the sectors of the main thrust as well as sufficiently high densities of artillery, tanks and rifle troops. Moreover, in the course of the commenced offensive it was essential to have an influx of additional forces to replenish the losses and maintain superiority over the enemy on the main axis in the course of the entire operation. Without this the offensive capabilities of the troops gradually dropped, the superiority over the enemy achieved at the start of the fighting was lost and the operation was not further developed.

In certain operations during the second and third periods of the war, even with an overall superiority in men and weapons, it was impossible to establish predominant superiority over the enemy on the axes of advance. Thus, the main reason for the inconclusiveness of the offensive operations in the Baltic in the autumn of 1943 and the winter of 1944 was the shortage of men and weapons on the given strategic sector. Precisely at this time the main efforts of the Soviet troops were concentrated on the right bank Ukraine with the aim of decisively defeating Army Group South.(16)

For this same reason at the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944 it was impossible to fully carry out the tasks set by Hq SHC for the troops of the First Baltic, Western and Belorussian Fronts on the western strategic sector. On this sector the Soviet troops were unable to conduct offensive operations with decisive aims, as the Nazi Army Group Center in terms of the number of personnel virtually equaled the opposing three Soviet fronts. As a result, in the course of the offensive on the western sector which moreover was conducted for an extended time without operational lulls with a great shortage of men and equipment in the formations under severe weather conditions, the Soviet troops were unable to reach the line indicated by Hq SHC (Polotsk, Lepel, Mogilev, the Ptich River). The results of the operations were also influenced by shortcomings in the actions of the troops. Having analyzed the reasons for the failures in the offensive actions of the Western Front, a commission of the GKO [State Defense Committee] pointed to substantial shortcomings in the organization of the offensive operations and troop command.(17)

In certain instances the offensive operations of the Soviet troops were incomplete due to factors of a political nature. Thus, on 5 September 1944,

Hq SHC ordered the troops of the Karelian and Leningrad Fronts to cease offensive operations against the Finnish Army with the announcement of Finland with its break with Nazi Germany.(18) For an analogous reason, on 9 September 1944, offensive actions of the Soviet troops were halted on Bulgarian territory.(19)

Thus, the Soviet union demonstrated to the entire world that predatory aims were alien to it.

In summing up the review of the inconclusiveness of a number of offensive operations, it is essential to stress one important feature which was that these operations in their majority were not ineffective or even unsuccessful. For example, in the course of the first counteroffensive and general offensive in the winter of 1941-1942, the Soviet Army threw the enemy back 150-400 km on various sectors, it defeated about 50 enemy divisions, thereby dispelling the myth of the invincibility of the Hitler Wehrmacht.(21)

Regardless of the shortcomings and errors which occurred and which were exacerbated by the difficult objective conditions, Soviet military art during the most difficult first period of the war as a whole was able to carry out the tasks confronting it. The experience gained was employed for finding the ways to increase the effectiveness of the operations conducted in the subsequent periods of the war.

#### FOOTNOTES

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7. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 4, p 308.
8. TsAMO [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 132-A, inv. 2642, file 95, sheet 27.



9. "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945. Kratkaya istoriya" [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945. A Brief History], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1984, p 127.
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13. Ibid., folio 229, inv. 3779, file 3, sheet 253.
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16. See: S.M. Shtemenko, "Generalnyy shtab v gody voyny" [The General Staff in the War Years], Moscow, Voenizdat, Book 1, 1985, pp 306-307.
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## OPERATIONAL MANEUVER OF AVIATION WITHOUT CHANGE OF BASING

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 87 (signed to press 23 Dec 86) pp 23-29

[Article by Lt Gen Avn V.A. Gorbachev, candidate of military sciences; the article has been written from the experience of the Great Patriotic War]

[Text] The experience of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 has given us numerous examples of the successful execution of maneuvering aviation forces between fronts. The Soviet Command, in skillfully employing the high combat qualities of aviation, quickly and covertly concentrated large air groupings on the most important sectors. By the joint efforts of the air forces of adjacent fronts it was possible to win and hold air supremacy and stage by stage to defeat the enemy initially in one front and then another.

The operational maneuver of air formations and units was carried out between fronts of one or different strategic sectors. In the latter instance this was done by changing the base airfields mainly during the period of operational lulls and in the former instance, both with a change as well as without it. However, the regrouping of forces in the course of operations required precise organization and time. In the aim of camouflaging it was essential to make the moves to the new airfields in small groups of aircraft and, as a rule, during darkness. Moreover, in the relocating the activity of the formations and bases being moved declined. For this reason, the operational maneuver of aviation into the zone of an adjacent front was often carried out without changing basing by shifting efforts and employing the operating radius of the aircraft (maneuvering by the radius of operation). This was also good in the fact that it made it possible for the Soviet command in the course of the fighting to quickly build up the air forces of the fronts (the air armies) and surprise the enemy using adjacent formations, and without requiring the additional expenditure of time and forces to prepare the airfield network and to organize and carry out the relocating of aviation from one area to another. This type of maneuver did not represent any difficulty for the air units and formations assigned as reinforcements, as they were operating from their own airfields. The main condition for its employment was that the range of the flight to the designated targets not exceed the tactical range of the aircraft.

The decision for the maneuvering of aviation formations and units between fronts was taken by Hq SHC. Then either its representative personally or over the communications equipment gave the mission directly to the air forces commander of the front (the air army). Information on the aims and tasks to the aviation assigned for participating in the operations of adjacent fronts was provided only to a narrow circle of leaders.

In the operations of the Soviet troops during the first period of the war, the Air Forces were confronted with the task of maximally weakening the activeness of Nazi aviation and in cooperation with the troops of the fronts to check the enemy offensive. For this reason from the very outset there was chiefly the maneuvering of attack aviation forces. For example, for assisting the troops of the Bryansk Front in launching counterstrikes against the advancing enemy 2d Panzer Group, Hq SHC on 27 August 1941 ordered the commander of the Soviet Army Air Forces, Gen P.F. Zhigarev, to prepare and during the period from 29 August through 4 September to carry out an air operation using the Air Forces of the Bryansk Front (commander, Gen F.P. Polynin), the Central Front (commander, Gen G.A. Vorozheykin), and the Reserve Front (commander, Gen Ye.M. Nikolayenko), the 1st Reserve Air Group and a portion of the long-range bomber formations in the aim of defeating Guderian's panzer group in the area of Pochep, Starodub, Shostka and to check its advance on the Konotop axis. The operation's plan was worked out at the air forces staff. Some 95 combat aircraft were to be involved from the Bryansk Front, 54 from the Central, 120 from the Reserve, 95 from the 1st Reserve Air Group and 100 from the long-range bomber aviation, that is, a total of 464 combat aircraft (230 bombers, 55 ground attack planes and 179 fighters). (1) Over the 2 days assigned for the softening up, it was impossible to move all the aviation involved from the adjacent field forces to the airfields of the air forces of the Bryansk Front. For this reason a majority of the air units and formations were to conduct combat operations without changing their base.

In approving the plan, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief wrote: "In order to prevent the enemy from catching its breath and recovering generally, its columns must be hit continuously, wave after wave, the entire day long from morning to darkness." (2) These instructions were issued to the appropriate commanders of the front air forces. An operations group headed by the deputy commander of the Air Forces, Gen I.F. Petrov, was established for directing the air operations. The air operation was to last 6 days. The bombers and ground attack planes were to continuously attack the enemy tank columns, making over 4,000 aircraft sorties during this time. As a result of the active air operations and the counterstrikes by our troops, the enemy tank grouping suffered significant losses and its rate of advance was substantially reduced.

In October 1941, in the defense of Moscow, the air forces of the Moscow Military District (commander, Gen N.A. Sbyrov), a portion of the forces from the VI Air Defense Fighter Corps (commander, Col A.I. Mitenkov) and several divisions of long-range bomber aviation and two composite air divisions of the Northwestern Front were to operate in the interests of the Western and Reserve Fronts. Over a period of 9 days (2-10 October), they attacked the enemy grouping advancing in the zones of these fronts. Particularly characteristic were the actions of the air forces of the Moscow Military District the units

and formations of which in October-December 1941 were repeatedly shifted to one and then another operational sector. Thus, from 5 October, the air forces of the Moscow Military District carried out combat missions on the Yukhnov sector, from 25 October on the Serpukhov, from 8 November on the Tula, from 22 November on the Klin-Solnechnogorsk, from the second half of December on the Mozhaysk and with the start of the breakthrough of the front line around Moscow, on the Maloyaroslavets sector.(3)

Attention should also be given to the experience of organizing cooperation of the air formations assigned as reinforcements with the air forces and troops of the adjacent fronts during the first months of the war. Usually the cover of the bombers and ground attack planes was provided by fighter aviation from that front for which the maneuver was carried out. Due to the lack of direct radio and telegraph contact for organizing cooperation both with the fighters and the ground troops, a representative was sent out who was a responsible officer from the staff of the air division. However, there was no guarantee that agreement would be reached on all questions of joint actions, as the base airfields of the bombers and ground attack planes were a significant distance apart. Soon thereafter on the Leningrad Front they worked out certain special ground signals for cooperation and these subsequently were employed on other fronts:

- I -- wait;
- L -- attack target;
- + -- return to base airfield.(4)

In the Battle of Moscow, there was a tendency to carry out an operational maneuver of aviation to zones of adjacent fronts in the aim of winning air supremacy on the most important operational sectors. Here due to a lack of time, the maneuver was made without changing the base of a majority of the air formations. Thus, on 10 October, Hq SHC issued a directive to the commander of the Soviet Army Air Forces which pointed out that according to secret data on 12-13 in the area of the Western Front the enemy was planning to make a massed air raid. The enemy had to be anticipated, destroying its aviation on the airfields of the northwestern and southwestern sectors. In accord with the directive, a plan for the combat operations of the Air Forces was quickly worked out for the period from 11 through 18 October. To be involved in it were the air forces of the Northwestern, Western, Bryansk, Southwestern and Southern Fronts as well as formations of long-range bomber aviation.

In terms of their scope, the involved forces and tasks, the actions of the air forces against the airfields represented an air operation conducted on a wide front in a short period of time and with decisive goals. The results of the operation were very high. The commander of the Air Forces reported to Hq SHC: "The Red Army Air Forces during the period from 11 through 15 October 1941 conducted a series of bomber strikes against enemy airfields on the northwestern, western and southern sectors. In just 2 days (11-12 October) and during the night of 13 October, some 166 aircraft were destroyed at the airfields of Vitebsk, Smolensk, Orel, Orsha, Siverskaya, N. Dugin and others. As a total from 11 through 18 October, according to incomplete data, at least 500 enemy aircraft were destroyed at airfields.... By the strikes against the

airfields a major defeat has been dealt to the enemy aviation and as a result of this its planned massed strike has been thwarted."(5)

Yet it must be pointed out that an operational maneuver of aviation by using the aircraft operating range at the outset of the war was rarely employed. This can be explained primarily by the difficult situation, as well as by the enemy's supremacy in the air, by the losses of our aviation and by the existing organizational structure of the Air Forces. The experience of the first months showed that the allocation of air formations to the combined-arms armies tied down and impeded the massing of aviation on the required sectors. Moreover, the aircraft of frontal aviation had a short tactical range, particularly the IL-2 ground attack planes (around 350 km), while the organizing of cooperation with troops and the air forces of adjacent fronts was impeded by the insufficient equipping of aviation with communications.

By the time of the counteroffensive at Moscow, the commanders and staffs of all levels had gained certain experience in controlling combat operations of aviation. There began to be clearer cooperation of the frontal aviation with the ground troops, with the formations of long-range bomber aviation and the air defense aviation, as well as the air forces of the adjacent fronts. The air force staffs of the fronts began to work out cooperation plans which indicated the tasks of the ground troops and the aviation, the base airfields of the air formations, the intensity of aircraft sorties, signals of reciprocal identification and so forth. At the same time, headquarters bodies (operations groups) were established and these coordinated the air operations of two and more fronts within a single strategic task. As a rule, these were headed by representatives of Hq SHC from the leadership of the Air Forces. Thus, the member of the Air Forces Military Council, Corps Commissar P.S. Stepanov, coordinated air operations in the Battle of Moscow.

In the aim of building up the strike force of aviation and increasing its mobility, upon the decision of Hq SHC, in May-November 1942, the air forces of the fronts were reorganized into air armies. The air army included homogeneous (bomber, ground attack and fighter) air divisions.(7) Such an organizational structure of the Air Forces ensured centralized command of the aviation on a scale of the front field forces and made it possible to effectively and rapidly carry out a maneuver of the formations and units between fronts.

In 1942-1943, the massing of the efforts of the adjacent air formations in the zone of a single front increased from operation to operation. For example, in August 1942, after the collapse of the plan to capture Stalingrad from the west and the south, the Nazis attempted to break through to the city on two narrow sectors of the Stalingrad Front. On 17 August, their assault groupings which had a double or triple superiority in forces over our troops and with the support of over 1,000 aircraft began crossing the Don in the areas of Vertyachiy and Peskovatka. The 16th Air Army (commander, Gen P.S. Stepanov) of the Stalingrad Front at this time was still in the formative stage and its forces were not sufficient to put up proper resistance to the enemy. Gens A.M. Vasilevskiy and A.A. Novikov who arrived at the front decided to immediately shift the efforts of the 8th Air Army (commander, Gen T.T. Khryukin) of the Southeastern Front to destroy the crossings. In



carrying out this task, the formations of the 16th and 8th Air Armies from 17 through 23 August made around 1,000 aircraft sorties. The crossing of the German troops was checked. (8)

It is essential to point out that in the Battle of Stalingrad there was a wider maneuver and concentration of aviation on the axes of the main thrusts of the ground troops than in the preceding operations. Due to the combining of the efforts of the 2d, 8th, 16th and 17th Air Armies and the ADD [long-range aviation], the actions of which were coordinated by the representative of Hq SHC, Gen A.A. Novikov, the Soviet Air Forces succeeded in carrying out three major missions: the winning of operational air supremacy, the active supporting of the ground troops and the establishing of an air blockade over the surrounded Nazi grouping. (9)

In 1943, the need arose of massing the forces of not only the attack aviation but also the fighter aviation. It was essential to maneuver the fighter formations in the aim of building up the efforts of the adjacent air armies to cover the ground troops in breaking through the enemy defenses and exploiting a tactical success into an operational one. Such a maneuver was carried out particularly frequently in carrying out the mobile groups of fronts to battle. For example, in the course of the counteroffensive at Kursk on 19 July 1943, after committing the 3d Guards Tank Army to battle on the left wing of the Bryansk Front, the enemy unleashed massed air strikes against it, thereby reducing the activity of its air operations against the Western and Central Fronts. There were not enough fighter units in the 15th Air Army (commander, Gen N.F. Naumenko) which comprised the Bryansk Front. For this reason, the Air Forces commander set the task for the commander of the 16th Air Army of the Central Front, Gen S.I. Rudenko, to immediately cover the troops of the 3d Guards Tank Army against enemy bomber strikes in the area of Zmiyevka, Novo-Petrovsk, Stanovoy Kolodez. The VI Fighter Air Corps (commander, Gen A.B. Yumashev) was assigned to carry out this task. (10) At the same time, formations of the II Bomber Air Corps (commander, Gen V.A. Ushakov) from the 1st Air Army (commander, Gen M.M. Gromov) of the Western Front, in operating from their own airfields, launched strikes against enemy troops in the area of the Bryansk Front. (11) As a result of the measures taken, the conditions for continuing the offensive of the 3d Guards Tank Army were improved. Subsequently, considering this experience, they began to plan ahead of time for maneuvering the fighter air formations into the zones of adjacent fronts.

With the delivery to the Air Forces of new aircraft with greater tactical range, the operational maneuver without changing bases became a customary phenomenon. The most characteristic were the actions of the formations from the air armies in the zones of adjacent fronts during the Belorussian Offensive Operation of 1944. As is known, four fronts participated in the operation: the First, Second and Third Belorussian and the First Baltic. The troops of the fronts were supported, respectively, by the 6th Air Army (commander, Gen F.P. Polynin) and the 16th Air Army (commander, Gen S.I. Rudenko), the 4th Air Army (commander, Gen K.A. Vershinin), the 1st Air Army (commander, Gen T.T. Khryukin) and the 3d Air Army (commander, Gen N.F. Papavin) numbering over 5,000 combat aircraft as well as the long-range and air defense aviation. The aviation grouping established by Hq SHC conformed fully to the overall concept of the strategic operation. It was possible to

mass the air forces on those operational sectors where not only an operational but also a strategic success had to be exploited.

Thus, on 26 June 1944, our reconnaissance established that the 4th German Army had begun a retreat from the areas from Orsha and Mogilev to behind the Berezina River. Aviation was given the mission of preventing the planned retreat of the grouping and holding it on the line of the river so that the troops of the First and Third Belorussian Fronts could beat the enemy to Minsk. However, the 4th Air Army of the Second Belorussian Front where the Nazi troop grouping was retreating did not have sufficient bomber forces for carrying out this mission. Upon instructions of the representative of Hq SHC for aviation, the commander of the Soviet Army Air Forces, Chief Mar Avn A.A. Novikov, the III Bomber Air Corps (commander, Gen A.Z. Kravetskiy) of the 16th Air Army of the First Belorussian Front was called in to aid the 4th Air Army's formations. In operating in the zone of the 2d Belorussian Front, the bombers launched a series of effective strikes against Nazi troop accumulations at the crossings over the Berezina River and against the crossings themselves.(12) By the joint efforts of the 4th and 16th Air Armies, an important operational task was successfully carried out: a large enemy grouping was tied down on the line of the Berezina River, and then surrounded and eliminated by our advancing troops.

Very indicative was the maneuver without changing bases carried out by formations of the 1st Air Army of the Third Belorussian Front into the operational zone of the First Baltic Front which had pushed deeply into the enemy defenses on the Shyaulyay sector in August 1944. The units and formations from the 3d Air Army of this front were based far from the line of combat contact and were experiencing a severe fuel shortage. The enemy, in taking advantage of the good situation, shifted reserves to Shyaulyay and launched a strong counterstrike against our ground troops. Enemy aviation, without encountering resistance, operated actively.

Considering the developing situation, Hq SHC assigned a portion of the forces of the 1st Air Army to help the 3d Air Army. At 1200 hours on 16 August, the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, MSU A.M. Vasilevskiy, over the high frequency telephone, gave the following task to the 1st Air Army: "...Assist the First Baltic Front in repelling the assaults of the enemy which has gone over to the offensive. By bomber and strafing actions destroy its tank grouping in the area of Pokryshkintsa, Kelma, Lyali."(13)

In operating from their own airfields, units and formations of the 1st Air Army over a period of 6 days made over 2,900 aircraft sorties (69 percent of all the aircraft sorties of the air army during this time) in the interests of the First Baltic Front. This made it possible not only to restore the temporarily lost air supremacy but also check the enemy counteroffensive. The crisis situation was quickly eliminated.

In the operation to capture konigsberg, the Third Belorussian Front was assigned significant air forces: the 1st and 3d Air Armies, a portion of the forces of the 18th Air Army (former long-range aviation), the Air Forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, the V Guards Bomber Air Corps of the 15th Air Army and the IV Bomber Air Corps of the 4th Air Army.(14) As a total by the

start of the storming the front had available some 2,444 combat aircraft, including 1,124 bombers (500 long-range, 432 frontal and 192 light night), 470 ground attack planes, 830 fighters and 20 torpedo aircraft. (15) Here only the 1st and 3d Air Armies were part of the front and based in its zone while the remaining forces operated from their main airfields.

The successful maneuvering of the air formations of the air armies without changing bases during the second and third periods of the war was aided not only by the better performance of the received aircraft but also by the increased organizational level of cooperation with the ground troops and control in all stages of carrying out the set battle tasks. The latter became possible due to the extensive introduction of radio communications which became the basic means of aircraft control in the air. An order of the Air Forces Commander in May 1943 put into effect the "Instructions on Organizing Auxiliary Control Posts (VPU) for Aviation." From the summer of that year they also began to establish forward command posts (PKP) in the air formations fighting over the battlefield.

The overall trend in the positioning of air control posts was the bringing of them closer to the front line. Thus, the command post of an air army was located 25-40 km from it, in 1943 the VPU was 15-25 km away, and in 1944-1945, 5-15 km. The PKP of the fighter and ground attack formations were deployed on the sector of the main thrust of the front in the area of the observation post of the combined-arms (tank) army some 1.5-2 (2-3) km from the contact line. In supporting the ground troops over the battlefield, the commander of a bomber air division set up his PKP here, too. As an example, in maneuvering the air formations of the X Ground Attack Air Corps of the 17th Air Army of the Third Ukrainian Front into the zone of the Second Ukrainian Front, their cooperation with the ground troops was carried out by a corps operational group located at the command post of the army commander for whom it was operating. In the army formations were operations groups from officers of the air divisions and these directly controlled the ground attack planes over the battlefield.

At the observation post of the army commander was located one other operations group headed by the commander of the air corps who, in having contact with the command post and the staff of the 17th Air Army by radio in the call-in and guidance nets, continuously received information on the ground and air situation, on the operations of our aviation, he adjusted the missions for the ground attack planes and informed the staffs of the air divisions of forthcoming air operations.

The staff of an air corps on the eve issued preliminary battle orders to its units and formations. An hour or two prior to take-off, they were given specific battle tasks with information on the situation, the indication of the aim of the operations and the required roster. For this the staff of the air corps had radio and wire contact with the staffs and the VPU of the 17th Air Army, the 5th Air Army (Second Ukrainian Front), and with the staff of the combined-arms army in the interests of which the corps was to operate, as well as with the staffs of its own formations. Such a system of control posts made it possible to effectively bring the inferior staffs information on the ground and air situation and promptly call in ground attack planes to the battlefield.



(after the giving of the task, they appeared over the target in 20-30 minutes). (16)

Thus, during the years of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Air Forces gained definite experience in carrying out an operational maneuver without changing bases. However, the maneuver still had not become widespread. This was explained by the insufficient operating range of the aircraft of frontal aviation, by the great length of the fronts, and by the difficulty of organizing cooperation with the supported troops. Moreover, the number of aircraft in the air armies of the fronts rapidly increased and the strengthening of the air groups was achieved chiefly by calling on the reserves of the Supreme High Command. At the same time, regardless of its limited employment, this method of massing aviation forces proved effective. In comparison with maneuvering with a change in the airfield, it was more effective and economic and to the greatest degree helped to achieve surprise in attacking the enemy. A study of the experience of conducting an operational maneuver without changing bases as well as research in this area can help to define new ways for carrying out the task of massing aviation forces on the required sectors.

#### FOOTNOTES

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2. Ibid.
3. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 135, inv. 12770, file 52, sheets 25-37, 78.
4. Ibid., folio 20013, inv. 1, file 6, sheet 9.
5. M.N. Kozhevnikov, op. cit., p 59.
6. [Not in text]
7. See: VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 10, 1980, p 20.
8. "Sovetskiye Voenno-Vozdushnyye Sily v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945 gg." [Soviet Air Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1968, p 102.
9. See: M.N. Kozhevnikov, op. cit., p 108.
10. TsAMO, folio 6 iak, inv. 142701, file 3, sheets 1-19.
11. Ibid., folio 2 bak, inv. 20522, file 1, sheet 8.
12. See: VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 8, 1972, p 16.

13. TsAMO, folio 290, inv. 3284, file 702, sheet 80.
14. Ibid., folio 5 gv. bak, inv. 142697, file 18, sheets 3-18; folio 4 bak, inv. 532227, file 1, sheets 34-35.
15. Ibid., folio 290, inv. 3284, file 19, sheet 63.
16. Ibid., folio 20541, inv. 1, file 82, sheets 186-188.

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## LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR MOBILE GROUPS OF FRONTS IN VISTULA-ODER OPERATION

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[Article by Col N.F. Polukhin and Lt Col Yu.D. Paytchenko, candidates of military sciences]

[Text] In terms of its scope and the achieved military-political results, the Vistula-Oder Operation (12 January-3 February 1945) is one of the outstanding strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War. In advancing at an average pace of 25 km a day, the troops of the First Belorussian and First Ukrainian Fronts over a period of 23 days advanced to a depth of up to 500 km, defeating a major Nazi troop grouping. For exploiting the success on the axes of the main thrusts of the fronts, powerful mobile groups consisting of four tank armies were committed to battle.

The commanders of the tank armies and their deputies for the rear services(1) during the Vistula-Oder Operation considered the experience of logistic support for the mobile groups of fronts in previous operations. However, under the conditions of the rapid offensive by the troops, the significant distance away from the combined-arms armies and the advance to a great depth, many questions of logistic support were significantly more complex.

In accord with the battle tasks and the experience of the previously conducted operations, by the start of the Vistula-Oder Operation they planned to establish in the mobile groups of the fronts the following supplies of materiel: 2.5-3.0 units of fire of ammunition, 4.0-5.0 loads of diesel fuel, 5.0-7.0 loads of gasoline and 20-30 daily rations of food.(2)

The stockpiling of such a large amount of materiel required intense work by the rear units, facilities and all rear bodies. The up to 4 loads of diesel fuel and 5 fuelings of gasoline available at the start of the operation made it possible for the mobile groups to fight for 7-8 days. Here it was felt that the minimum fuel supply for the formations and units in the course of the operation should be at least 1.5 fuelings, that is, in addition to the fully loaded tanks of the vehicles, 0.5 of a fueling should follow in the organic transport. As can be seen from Table 1, the supplies established by the start of the operation for virtually all types of materiel had not been brought up to the set amounts. This particularly was true of fuel and food. The basic

reason for the arising situation was the shortening of the preparatory period for the operation by 8 days(3) and also the lack of containers in the tank army for loading fuel as well as the great distance of the food procurement areas from the troops. As a whole, considering the delivery of the essential materiel in the course of the operation, the supply level for the mobile groups with the basic types of ammunition was from 2.1 to 3.2 units of fire, from 2.9 to 5.2 loads of fuel and from 10.0 to 23.6 daily rations of food. This would make it possible to successfully carry out the pending battle tasks.

Table 1

Supplies of Materiel in Tank Armies by Start of Operation\*

Tank Armies	Ammunition, units of fire		Fuel, loads			Food, daily rations
	Rifle	Tank	KB-70 (gas)	AB (gas)	DT (diesel)	
1st Guards	2.4	2.3-3.0	5.2	4.0	3.3	23.6
2d Guards	2.8-3.1	3.2	4.8	3.9	2.9	10.0
3d Guards	2.1-2.9	2.4	4.1	4.3	3.8	20.0
4th	2.8	3.2	3.0	4.8	3.1	16.0

\* TsAMO [Central Archives of Ministry of Defense], folio 299, inv. 350416, file 1, sheets 113, 115, 117; folio 307, inv. 4148, file 326, sheets 215-216; folio 315, inv. 4467, file 16, sheets 134-135, 150; folio 324, inv. 4756, file 144, sheet 62; folio 236, inv. 51361, file 20, sheets 1-2.

Ammunition supply. The ammunition supply for the troops was planned by the sections of artillery supply under the directorates of the artillery commanders of the tank armies. The delivery of ammunition was organized by the directorates of the army rear services at the requests of the artillery supply sections. By the start of the operation the mobile groups of the fronts had: 2.1-3.1 units of fire for rifle cartridges, 3.0-4.9 units of fire for mortar shells, 3.0-6.7 units of fire for antiaircraft rounds, 2.3-3.3 units of fire of artillery rounds and 2.4-3.2 units of fire of tank rounds.(4) The established ammunition supplies were completely sufficient for supplying the troops until the end of the operation. Actual consumption of them did not exceed 0.6 units of fire for cartridges, 2.6 for mortar shells, 1.2 for artillery rounds and 1.6 for tank rounds. For the 1st and 2d Guards Tank Armies which were committed to battle after the breakthrough of the tactical defensive zone, these indicators were even less and were, respectively: 0.5 units of fire, 0.6 units of fire, 0.5 units of fire and 0.7 units of fire.(5) The report of the rear services of the 1st Guards Tank Army commented:

"Regardless of the lessons of the past, the troops were again loaded down with ammunition and, in moving forward, were forced to leave the untransportable surpluses on the starting line on the western bank of the Vistula River. The abandoned supplies were subsequently transported by an army transport element to the rail head."(6) In the 4th Tank Army, the ammunition supplies established in the troops exceeded the capacity of the transport, and as a consequence of this a portion on the first day had to be partially left on the ground until the end of the operation.(7)

In the course of the operation, the units and formations of the mobile groups received ammunition from the mobile artillery dumps of the armies or their departments. For example, in the 1st Guards Tank Army, Artillery Dump No. 3172 had the task of following the advancing troops of supplies of ammunition of 0.3 unit of fire for the main types of weapons (57-, 76- and 122-mm guns) and 0.1 unit of fire for the remaining calibers. Some 160 motor vehicles were assigned to carry these supplies from army transport.(8) In the 2d Guards Tank Army, two battalions of the 76th Separate Motor Vehicle Regiment were assigned for transporting Artillery Dump No. 3116 with ammunition supplies of 0.25 unit of fire behind the troops.(9) The other artillery dumps, as a rule, did not move until the operation's end, being located in the regions of the rail heads. The mobile departments of the artillery dumps played an important role in supplying the units of the mobile groups with ammunition.

Fuel supply. The experience of supplying the mobile groups of the fronts with fuels in previous operations had indicated that this task, as a rule, was the most complex in the operation of the rear bodies. The supplies of fuel (in loads) established by the start of the operation and their echeloning in the tank armies are shown in Table 2. As is seen from the table, none of the armies succeeded in fully establishing the planned supplies. For example, in the 4th Tank Army there was 0.9 of a load less than the established standard for diesel fuel, 0.5 for motor gasoline and 2.0 less for KB-70 gasoline.(10) Instructive data are provided, for example, by an analysis for fuel consumption over the entire operation, as well as the average daily consumption in the stages of the most intense fighting. With an offensive of the tank armies at an average rate of 25-40 km a day, average daily diesel fuel consumption was 0.2-0.27 of a load, for motor vehicle gasoline it was 0.3-0.34 and for aviation gasoline 0.2-0.34 of a load.(11) In committing tank armies to the breach and in pursuing the enemy, the average daily consumption of diesel fuel increased significantly, reaching 0.4-0.5 of a load. Fuel consumption by the tank armies over the entire operation is shown in Table 3. With such high consumption, when fuel at the army dumps and their departments had run out and the troops were more than 700 km away from the supply depots, the mobile groups were forced to halt combat and wait for a fuel delivery.

In supplying the mobile groups with fuel, a positive role was played by separating the functions of the two field fuel dumps existing in each tank army for the period of the operation. One of these performed the role of a maneuvering dump which followed directly behind the troops while the other received fuel from industry at the rail head and organized its dispatch to the mobile dump by motor vehicle columns.



Table 2

## Echeloning of Fuel in Tank Armies by Start of Operation\*

Tank Armies	KB-70			Vehicle Gasoline			Diesel Fuel		
	a	b	c	a	b	c	a	b	c
1st Guards	2.6	2.6	5.2	2.9	1.1	4.0	2.5	0.8	3.3
2d Guards	3.2	1.6	4.8	3.3	0.6	3.9	2.3	0.6	2.9
3d Guards	3.1	1.0	4.1	3.3	1.0	4.3	2.9	0.9	3.8
4th	2.2	0.8	3.0	3.3	1.5	4.8	2.5	0.6	3.1

\* TsAMO, folio 299, inv. 350416, file 1, sheet 115; folio 307, inv. 4148, file 326, sheet 215; folio 315, inv. 4467, file 16, sheet 134; folio 324, inv. 4756, file 144, sheet 62.

Key: a--in troops  
b--at army dumps  
c--total

Table 3

## Fuel Consumption by Tank Armies During Operation\*

Tank Armies	Diesel Fuel		Gasoline		KB-70	
	Load	Tons	Load	Tons	Load	Tons
1st Guards	3.9	1175	6.5	2535	6.0	382
2d Guards	4.8	1696	6.6	3375	7.4	354
3d Guards	6.0	1920	7.6	3519	6.7	392
4th	4.7	1214	6.7	1739	4.1	249

\* TsAMO, folio 299, inv. 350416, file 1, sheets 116-117; folio 307, inv. 4148, file 34, sheet 11; folio 315, inv. 4467, file 125, sheet 99; folio 324, inv. 4756, file 144, sheet 36.

Regardless of the effort made by the command of the fronts, it was not fully possible to bring the front dumps closer and replenish the fuel supplies expended in the army. As a consequence of this the mobile groups at this time had an insufficient supply of all types of fuel. Thus, in the troops of the 2d Guards Tank Army there was 0.5 load of diesel fuel, 0.3 of automotive gasoline and 0.2 load of aviation gasoline. The 3d Guards Tank Army had, respectively, 0.3, 0.4 and 0.1 fuel loads.(12) The troops could go over to subsequent operations only after an operational lull needed to replenish the fuel supplies and bring up the rear.

In the course of the Vistula-Oder Operation, the tank armies captured a number of enemy fuel dumps. However, the fuel supply service was unable to employ this without laboratory analysis. Testing was entrusted to the army field laboratories (PL and PSL) of the field army fuel dumps and came down to detecting mechanical impurities and water in the diesel fuel as well as determining the viscosity of oils. The octane ratings of the various grades of fuel had to be determined in the central supply bodies. It was permitted to employ captured fuel in Soviet equipment only after a thorough laboratory analysis but this required a good deal of time.

Food supply. During the period of preparing for an operation, the rear services of the tank armies carried out extensive work to procure food. Supplies were established both by the centralized delivery under schedule orders of the fronts chiefly by procurement from local sources.

The 2d Guards Tank Army procured food from local resources in the Grubeszczow District (Poland) a distance of 250-300 km from the concentration area. Regardless of the fulfillment of the plan for the procurement of meat, the army rear services during this period at times experienced difficulties in supplying the troops with meat products and fats, since the front's rear services did not fulfill the plan for the centralized delivery of these products.(13)

The 4th Tank Army secured its main types of food products in Kamenets-Podolskiy Oblast a distance of 500 km from the troops as well as in Krasna District (Poland) which was 250-300 km away. The main difficulty was that at times food procurement coincided with intense operations of rail transport and the readying of motor transport for the forthcoming operation. But, regardless of all the difficulties, the food supplies were basically brought up to the established rates. The troops had from 7 to 10 daily rations and at the army dumps there were from 3 to 13.(14)

With the start of the operation, the army food dumps established head departments which were deployed 20-30 km from the troops. In the course of the offensive, by the end of the third-fourth day, the dump departments were usually up to 150 and more kilometers behind. In such a situation the chiefs of the army rear services organized mobile food units. The vehicles loaded with food (0.5 of a daily ration) followed directly behind the troops.

With the entry of Western Poland and Germany, the tank armies replenished their food supplies from captured sources.

The discovery, collection, guarding, accounting and evacuation of captured supplies in the armies were entrusted to the captured equipment sections. All food was concentrated, as a rule, at the captured property dumps. After conducting quality analysis in the laboratories of the army sanitary-epidemiological detachments, this was made available to the army food supply departments for use in the troops.

Captured supplies often covered the needs of the troops. Using them, for example, in the 3d Guards Tank Army on the 6th day of the operation the army rear services in the Radomsko area set up a department of a food dump.(15) Supply questions were resolved analogously in the other tank armies. Because of this the need to move the departments of the food dumps on the ground was eliminated. The captured food dumps were usually under the command of officers from the army intendant section with attached NCO and rank-and-file personnel. Such temporary groups also performed the functions of food dump departments. The use of captured supplies facilitated the work of the food supply bodies.

The rapid advance of the troops and the frequent changes in the situation impeded the prompt supply of hot meals to the personnel of the mobile groups. Nevertheless, during darkness kitchens with hot food moved up at least twice a day directly into the battle formations of the troops or to the stations where the units were replenished with fuel and ammunition. When the troops drew away from the field bakeries, the units which carried two or three daily rations of flour could exchange this for fresh bread in a local bakery.

Uniform supply. During the preparatory period, in carrying out great work, the uniform supply services of the armies provided the personnel with 100 percent winter uniforms. The personnel received clothing supplies basically from the front dumps and partially from the troop and army repair shops.

In considering the experience of the previous operations, the staffs of the army rear services began assigning mobile clothing supply units from the field army intendant dumps and these were located under the rear services headquarters. In the course of the operation, the mobile units, in traveling to the corps, supplied the troops with lacking clothing. For quickly replacing this, the units established an exchange pool of shops. In the 4th Tank Army this was, for example, 1,750 pairs of footwear. At the army dump there were 2,000 sets of underwear and 3,000 pairs of footwear in the exchange pool.(16) In the course of the operation, the requests from units to replenish clothing were not received by the staffs of the army rear services. By the end of the operation, the units and formations already had surplus clothing which they turned over to the army dumps. For example, in the 4th Tank Army six carloads of clothing were turned over to the army dump.(17) Having fallen significantly behind the troops in the course of the rapid offensive, the repair shops, as a rule, did not carry out repairs. In such a situation the troops usually drew on the exchange pool of supplies.

Transporting of materiel. In the course of the operation, the supplies of materiel for the mobile groups of the fronts were replenished basically by stocks allocated by the fronts and delivered to army dumps. In addition, captured equipment was a source for replenishing the stocks and in individual

instances, also procurement from local resources. With the high rate of advance, the supply of the mobile groups with fuel was of high priority. The promptness of its delivery assumed particular significance. Fuel delivery to the tank armies was uneven. The consumption of automotive gasoline and diesel fuel was significantly higher than the deliveries to the armies from the front dumps. Thus, the units and formations of the 3d Guards Tank Army from 12 through 17 January consumed 1,200 tons of gasoline and 650 tons of diesel fuel. But over this period the front supplied the armies with only 250 tons of automotive gasoline and 150 tons of diesel fuel. The supply of these types of fuel, in comparison with consumption, was, respectively, just 21 and 22 percent.(19) Analogous situations developed at times in the other armies.

The uneven delivery of fuel from the front dumps led to great stoppages of motor transport at the rail heads (loading stations). For example, during the most intense periods of the operation, the motor transport of the 1st Guards Tank Army waited 4 days for a delivery of fuel. The fuel delivery run from 20 January reached 350 km and by the end of the operation was over 580 km.(20)

By the start of the Vistula-Oder Operation, motor transport regiments were organized in anticipating the increased demand for motor transport to carry materiel with troop operations on Polish and German territory in the 1st, 2d and 3d Guards Tank Armies. The 76th Separate Motor Vehicle Regiment of the 2d Guards Tank Army had 600 motor vehicles (77 percent of the TOE), while the 77th Separate Motor Vehicle Regiment of the 3d Guards Tank Army had 637 vehicles (83 percent of the TOE).(21) Regardless of this, in the units there were still not enough motor vehicles for supplying the mobile groups. Thus, in the 2d Guards Tank Army, by the start of the operation the carrying capacity of motor transport (with a weight of 2,370 tons for a single unit of fire and 983 tons for a single fuel load) was: 1,450 tons for sided vehicles and 366 tons for tanker vehicles.(22) This clearly shows under what strain the army motor transport had to operate.

In the course of the operation the army transport was involved in delivering materiel from the front dumps, and troop transport from the army dumps. For example, when the delivery run of the 4th Tank Army reached 500 km, army transport was unable to ensure planned transporting of the materiel. By a decision of the army chief of the rear services, all free troop transport was mobilized. Some 170 vehicles from the army units and formations participated just in transporting ammunition from the Mostki--Jusefow area to the bridgehead on the western bank of the Oder.(23) In addition to motor transport, for delivering materiel they also successfully employed the so-called "rail shuttles." Thus, when the 1st Guards Tank Army reached the Poznan area, for delivering fuel from the front dump, a "shuttle" with a load capacity of 300 tons was organized from 20 captured railroad tank cars and a steam locomotive.(24) Fuel and ammunition were delivered by a similar method to the 2d Guards and 4th Tank Armies.

\* \* \*

In the course of the Vistula-Oder Operation, the rear staffs of the First Belorussian and First Ukrainian Fronts, in skillfully employing the rich experience of logistic support for mobile groups in the Lwow-Sandomierz and

Belorussian Operations, successfully carried out the difficult tasks of logistic support for tank armies under the difficult conditions of the winter offensive. The organizing of logistic support for the mobile groups was based upon the following principles:

- a) The early establishing of material supplies at the tank army dumps and in the troops with the aid of the front rear services;
- b) The assigning in the armies of mobile, light rear echelons (mobile dumps) for following the troops into the breach;
- c) Continuous replenishing of the stocks of materiel in the troops and in the mobile echelons using the motor transport of the front;
- d) Wherever possible, the use of captured supplies.

The army motor transport played the decisive role (around 70 percent) in delivering freight to the troops. Delivery by rail transport was provided only to the rail head. We should also note the experience of employing "rail shuttles" from captured rolling stock and these helped greatly in supplying materiel to the tank armies.

A thorough investigation and study of logistic support for the mobile groups of the fronts during the Vistula-Oder Operation can provide effective aid in resolving various questions of the operation of the troop and operational rear services under modern conditions.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. The commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army was Col Gen Tank Trps M.Ye. Katukov, the deputy commander for rear services was Maj Gen V.F. Konkov; the commander of the 2d Guards Tank Army was Col Gen Tank Trps S.I. Bogdanov and the deputy commander for rear services, Col P.S. Antonov; the commander of the 3d Guards Tank Army was Col Gen P.S. Rybalko and the deputy commander for rear services, Maj Gen V.A. Mikutskiy; the commander of the 4th Tank Army was Col Gen D.D. Lelyushenko and the deputy commander for the rear services was Col A.K. Yarkov.
2. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 233, inv. 2356, file 431, sheet 73; folio 315, inv. 4467, file 125, sheets 156-157; folio 324, inv 4756, file 144, sheets 7-9.
3. Because of the difficult situation of the American and English troops in December 1944 in Ardennes and the request of the English government to provide help to the Allies, Hq SHC shifted the date for the start of the operation from 20 to 12 January 1945.
4. TsAMO, folio 299, inv. 350416, file 1, sheets 113, 115, 117; folio 305, inv. 4148, file 326, sheets 215-216; folio 315, inv. 4467, file 16, sheets 134-135, 150; folio 324, inv. 4756, file 144, sheet 62; folio 236, inv. 51361, file 20, sheets 1-2.



5. Ibid., inv. 350416, file 1, sheets 116-117; folio 307, inv. 4148, file 34, sheet 11; folio 315, inv. 4467, file 125, sheet 99; folio 324, inv. 4756, file 144, sheet 36.
6. Ibid., folio 299, inv. 350416, file 1, sheet 120.
7. Ibid., folio 324, inv. 4756, file 144, sheet 7.
8. Ibid., folio 299, inv. 350416, file 1, sheet 117.
9. Ibid., folio 307, inv. 4148, file 326, sheet 214.
10. Ibid., folio 325, inv. 4756, file 144, sheet 62.
11. Ibid., folio 299, inv. 350416, file 1, sheets 116-117; folio 307, inv. 4148, file 34, sheet 11; folio 315, inv. 4467, file 125, sheet 99; folio 324, inv. 4756, file 144, sheet 36.
12. Ibid., folio 307, inv. 4148, file 344, sheet 135; folio 315, inv. 4467, file 16, sheet 169.
13. Ibid., folio 307, inv. 4148, file 326, sheet 215.
14. Ibid., folio 324, inv. 4756, file 144, sheet 56.
15. Ibid., folio 315, inv. 4467, file 16, sheet 138.
16. Ibid., folio 324, inv. 4756, file 144, sheet 61.
17. Ibid., sheet 62.
18. [Not in text]
19. Ibid., folio 315, inv. 4467, file 16, sheet 146.
20. Ibid., folio 299, inv. 350416, file 1, sheet 116.
21. Ibid., folio 307, inv. 4148, file 326, sheet 213; folio 315, inv. 4767, file 16, sheet 142.
22. Ibid., folio 307, inv. 4148, file 326, sheets 214-215.
23. Ibid., folio 324, inv. 4756, file 144, sheet 44.
24. Ibid., folio 299, inv. 35046, file 1, sheet 112.

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## EVOLUTION OF VIEWS ON DEFENSIVE IN INTERWAR YEARS

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[Article by Col R.A. Savushkin, doctor of historical sciences; the given article continues the subject of the development of the defensive commenced by Col B.P. Frolov in issue No. 6, 1986]

[Text] During the period between the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars, serious attention was paid to the questions of organizing and conducting the defensive. Even in the 1920s, the notion was formulated that in a future war on individual sectors the need would arise for going over to the offensive and conducting front and army defensive operations on a broad front for the following purpose: saving forces for attacking on the crucial axis, gaining time needed to establish a grouping of forces and preparing for the offensive; holding space (areas, lines and routes); disorganizing the advancing enemy for a subsequent going over to a counteroffensive. The views concerning the aims of the defensive remained basically unchanged over the entire interwar period. However, under the impact of a number of factors, and primarily due to the increased technical equipping of the Soviet Armed Forces and the development of military art of the probable enemy, the views on the preparation and conduct of the defensive underwent significant changes.

In 1921-1929, the idea was proposed of holding and wearing down the enemy by retaining defensive areas by employing a maneuvering defense. Such a type of defensive was characterized by: the concentrating of main efforts in the first zone and the deployment of relatively small reserves (corps, army and front) in the subsequent ones; the holding and weakening of the advancing side in the tactical zone by the stubborn holding of the positions (lines) and the continuous building up of effort from in depth; considering the limited capabilities of the defending troops and their inability to hold the occupied positions for an extended time and the need to maintain a constant readiness to retreat and slip out from under the threatening enemy strike; the wide employment of the principle of the successive impact of the defending troops echeloned in depth on the assault groupings of the advancing side; the employment of a maneuvering defense, when space remains with the aim of wearing down the enemy and gaining time.

The manuals and regulations for the command personnel of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army], and the field manuals were aimed at making the defensive stubborn and active. Here attention was paid to indoctrinating the personnel in a spirit of high awareness and revolutionary steadfastness, independence, tenacity and an unshakable confidence in the force of one's weapons. There were plans to echelon the defenses in depth, to carefully organize the terrain in engineer terms, and establish in the army (front), in addition to the area of responsibility up to three or four defensive lines, and organize the fire plan considering the maneuvering nature of forthcoming actions. In the defensive system of a front (army), each of the defensive zones had its own purpose.

The zone of responsibility (forward defense area) was mainly designed to force the enemy to deploy prematurely and aim for the attack. Due to this the enemy's strength, intention and flanks were disclosed.(1) The first zone (the main zone or zone of main resistance) on which the main forces of the formation were positioned had the task of defeating and morally neutralizing the advancing side on the approaches to the zone of main resistance, and in the event of driving into it, destroying the advancing side.(2)

The second zone ("rear" or corps reserve) was the area for the positioning of the reserves and their support in conducting combat. Behind it, upon the decision of the superior command, rear lines could be established on which were positioned the army and front reserves. With a forced retreat of the troops, these served as a support for establishing a new defensive system.

Between the defensive zones "intermediate" zones (positions) were to be established and assigned for a regrouping in the course of the defensive.(3)

The main tasks of the front and army defensive operations were carried out in the tactical defensive zone (TZO), that is, within the first and second zones. The actions of the front and army command were aimed chiefly at promptly strengthening the troops defending the TZO by committing reserves and by regrouping from secondary sectors. In their remainder, front and army operations represented a complex of defensive battles by rifle corps. The width of the defensive zone of a rifle corps was 24-30 km;(4) for an army consisting of three corps, 80-100 km; for a front consisting of three or four armies, up to 400 km. The total depth considering the positioning of army and front reserves was around 100 km and the depth of an army defensive area was 20-35 km.

The operational configuration of the front and army on the defensive was single-echelon, with the assigning of a reserve. The front reserve was made up of rifle formations, and in the army reserve, in addition, there were "artillery weapons possessing great mobility in order to promptly give the required artillery density to the most dangerous sectors."(5) Particular attention was paid to establishing a system of antitank defense (PTO) which would include the preparation of antitank trenches, antitank minefields and the corresponding organization of river banks and ravines.(6) Field artillery was also to be employed as an active means for combating tanks. In order to secure the maneuvering of reserves and the regrouping of the troops in the course of a defensive operation, provision was made to cover the

communications junctions against enemy air raids using antiaircraft artillery and aviation. As for the configuration and the functioning of the air defense system of a front and an army, this question had just begun to be worked out.

As a whole, in describing views, concerning the preparation and conduct of defensive operations, one cannot help but point out that in the 1920s, Soviet military theorists correctly considered the probable strength of the advancing enemy and the limited capabilities of our troops on the defensive. Under these conditions, the principle of combining the stubborn holding of defensive areas with a maneuvering defense was the only correct one. On the operational-tactical and operational scales, the following questions had been well worked out: the configuration of the defensive system (the positioning and purpose of the zone; the deployment and tasks of the troop, standards and so forth); the preparation of the defensive operation (determining the method of conducting defensive actions, ascertaining the dangerous sector, the choice of the first defensive line, the configuration of the troop organisms for carrying out the battle task and the fire plan, the planning of counterartillery fire, the organizing of command and cooperation and so forth); the conduct of the defensive operation (the use of reserves, the organizing of counterstrikes, the parrying of the breakthrough of the defenses by regrouping the troops to threatened sectors, the carrying out of a planned retreat to rear lines and so forth). The questions of the engineer organization of the terrain had not been sufficiently settled. Antitank and air defenses were in the stage of development.

In 1930-1938, the development of views on the defensive was significantly determined by the technical rearming of the Soviet Army, by the development of enemy military art, by the influence of the experience of combat under positional conditions during the years of World War I and the following local wars, and by the elaboration by Soviet scientists of a theory of a deep offensive operation which made it possible to examine the questions of the defensive ahead of the development of the methods of enemy offensive actions.

A fundamental distinction of the defensive in the 1930s from the defensive of the 1920s was the successive carrying out of the demand of its insurmountability: "the defensive should be insurmountable for the enemy, no matter how strong it might be on the given sector." (7) It was felt that this could be achieved by the steadfastness, self-sacrifice and heroism of the troops as well as by the employment of new weapons and methods of effecting the enemy.

The main idea of the defensive was a harmonious combination of stubborn resistance by the troops of the holding echelon which occupied the TZO with the launching of powerful thrusts from in depth by specially established groupings of mobile troops. For this, as was pointed out in the draft regulation on the leading of the superior RKKA formations (an army) prepared for publication in 1935-1936, the defensive "should have a powerful assault echelon for assaulting the enemy which had been weakened by the breakthrough and for restoring the situation. The assault echelon should include cavalry, motorized and mechanized troops and rifle units" (8) and aviation should be involved in its actions. Thus, the concept of the continuous supply of reinforcements (reserves) to the TZO which was the basis of the defensive in

the 1920s came the idea of the maximum exhaustion of the enemy by the available weapons of the holding (first) echelon and the launching of a crushing counterstrike from in depth against the enemy grouping.

The realization of the elaborated views depended largely upon the ability of the defenses to neutralize the enemy's measures aimed at the simultaneous neutralization of the defenses to their entire depth. The appropriate configuration of the defenses, the echeloning of the troops and the engineer organization of the terrain were recommended for this purpose.

In depth the defenses of a front (army) were divided into three main zones: tactical, operational and rear. In the absence of direct contact with the enemy, a zone of obstacles(9) was established ahead of the tactical zone with the obstacle zone being defended by the forward detachments. On the eve of the war, this had come to comprise the basis of the forward operational zone of obstacles.

It was considered that the TZO was the most important defensive zone. Within its limits were located the first echelon rifle corps which were with their own forces, without relying on a continuous supply of reinforcements, as had been the case in the 1920s, to defeat the enemy infantry and tanks and bleed white its assault grouping.

The basis of the operational zone was the third area or the army defensive line (army rear line) on which were positioned the army different-purposed reserves which in their aggregate formed the assault echelon (group), the headquarters bodies, the supplies of materiel and the army rear bodies. In the course of a defensive operation, the forces located in this zone were to launch a thrust against the enemy of such force that afterwards it would be incapable of further advance.

In the rear zone a rear defensive zone (position) was established where were located a portion of the army reserves and the main front reserves (assault group) and behind this the heavy aviation airfields, the bodies of the front headquarters and partially the army headquarters and the rear bodies.(10) Provision was also made to establish "alternate defensive zones ('sections') located between the main zone and the rear line."(11) Their purpose was: to split the enemy assault grouping into parts, to isolate these, to defeat them and throw them back to the initial position.

In addition to the holding and assault echelons the operational configuration of an army also included an air group and a rear defensive group assigned to combat airborne forces and mechanized units which had broken through.

The operational configuration of the front was planned in a single echelon: all the armies comprising the holding echelon were formed up in a line. Moreover, the front had few reserves and an air group.

The main demand for organizing the defense of a front (army) was the establishing of a strong antitank cover for its main centers and to the entire depth. It was assumed that along the forward edge there would be the line of the main fire repulse of the attacking tanks and behind this the PTO zone



where the enemy tanks would suffer their main defeat, while in depth there would be army antitank areas in the event of the breakthrough of mechanized units in the positions of the assault group and the reserves.

At troop exercises of the Volga Military District in 1933, the antitank defense of the field force included the actions of different forces relying on antitank areas, namely: a group of maneuvering (motorized) small-caliber artillery and large-caliber machine guns which provided a "mobile antitank defense"; engineer and chemical warfare subunits which set out obstacles; tank, aviation, artillery and airborne units and formations launching coordinated counterstrikes.(12)

The organization of air defense in the 1930s began to be given significantly more attention than in the previous decade. The draft of the regulation on the leadership of superior RKKA formations devoted a special chapter to this. The air defense troops and their immediate rear were given the following goal: to cover the personnel and combat weapons against enemy air attack and reconnaissance. In accord with this the specific tasks of air defense were set: to actively combat enemy aviation, destroying its aircraft; to prevent the air enemy from reaching the defended objectives, to thwart their execution of combat missions and so forth. The air defense weapons included: anti-aircraft and field (adapted to fire at aircraft) artillery, fighter aviation, anti-aircraft machine guns, barrage balloons, anti-aircraft searchlights, sound locators and so forth. It was assumed that all the air defense weapons on the scale of an army defensive area would be united into an army air defense service. The deeper objectives of the front rear and the national rear were to be covered by national air defense weapons.

The provisions of the theory of front and army defensive operations were tested out on district maneuvers and experimental exercises. Thus, in maneuvers of the Ukrainian Military District in 1934, they worked on the following questions: the defense of a river; the defense of a rifle formation under maneuvering conditions; the defensive on a hurriedly occupied, unprepared line; the organizing of counteraction to a mechanized enemy corps which had broken through by the forces of the operational reserves. During the same year at experimental exercises, they tested the correctness and prospects of the idea of employing a cavalry division in cooperation with artillery, tanks and aviation as an assault group in repelling an enemy breakthrough of a defensive zone and the eliminating of the threat from an air dropped enemy force.

In 1939-1941, in working out the questions of the defensive, they proceeded from the particular features of the nature of Nazi troop actions on the offensive. All provisions which had been formulated in the 1930s were adjusted considering this. A number of important aspects in the preparation and conduct of the defensive was tested out in the course of the fighting on the Khalkhin-Gol River and in the Soviet-Finnish War. As a result, adjustments were incorporated in the configuration of the defensive.

At a conference of the superior command personnel of the RKKA held upon instructions of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee at the end of December 1940, there was a major thorough discussion

of the main areas for the development of military theory and raising the battleworthiness of the troops. At the conference it was pointed out that an army could defend itself in a zone of 80-100 km and have three defensive zones: a forward operational zone of obstacles (to a depth of 25-50 km), a tactical defensive zone (20-30 km) and an operational defensive zone (20-30 km).<sup>(13)</sup> The main zone of resistance, where the main efforts of the front and the armies were to be concentrated, was the tactical zone which consisted of three areas, including the security zone, and was to be defended by the rifle corps of the army first echelon. The operational zone which consisted of a maneuver zone and a rear army line was to be occupied by the army reserves and was assigned for combating major mechanized forces which had broken through the tactical zone. The front reserves, the headquarters and rear bodies were to be located in the rear zone.

In line with the high technical equipping of the Nazi Armed Forces and the reliance of the Nazi Command on stunning strikes by tank troops and aviation, great attention was given to increasing the viability of the defenses. The prewar regulations as well as the documents of the December (1940) Conference of Red Army Leadership emphasized that the defensive should be: antiartillery, capable of protecting the personnel and weapons against damage by massed artillery fire; antitank, capable of repelling massed enemy assaults on crucial sectors where the tank density approached 100-150 per kilometer of front; antiaircraft, capable of opposing strong bombing and strafing attacks by enemy aviation. The guarantee for success on the defensive was considered to be the greatest tenacity, activeness and decisiveness of operations and a constant desire of the troops not only to repel the thrusts of the advancing enemy but also to crush it.

The width of the defensive zone of the formations and field forces remained virtually unchanged and only its depth increased, the level of engineer organization and the equipping with materiel rose.

Wire obstacles, trenches, escarpments, barriers, antitank minefields, land mines and so forth comprise the basis of the engineer organization of the forward operational zone of obstacles (no-man's land). The engineer organization of the first zone could include antitank obstacles and engineer structures protecting the troops against enemy artillery fire. The main efforts of the engineer troops during the period of preparing for a defensive operation and battle were to be concentrated on organizing the space between the first and second zones in antitank terms.

The operational configuration of the front, as in the 1930s, was to be with a single echelon with the assigning of different-purpose reserves, and for an army, a single echelon (rifle corps and separate divisions in a line) with army reserves reinforced by antitank weapons of the High Command Reserve. From the latter, they were to organize an artillery antitank reserve (APTR). The reserves if possible were to include tank units or formations. The opinion was voiced that along with a first echelon it was also possible to organize a second (two rifle divisions and one tank). On the question of employing motorized and mechanized formations, the opinions at the 1940 December conference differed. Some felt that such formations should be available to the army commander and others thought they should be in the hands

of the front's commander. The cavalry was to be employed for combating airborne assault forces. A major role was assigned to air groups. A fundamentally new feature in the operational configuration was the abandoning of splitting the troops into holding and assault groups (echelons), as the idea of holding the enemy and not destroying it led to a psychologically undesirable effect.

The conduct of a strategic defensive on the scale of an entire front of armed combat was envisaged only in the initial period of a war. It was assumed that at first the aggressor's assault would be repelled, then its assault groupings would be bled white in defensive operations and only after this go over to a counteroffensive. The necessity of a retreat by an entire strategic front was considered improbable and for this reason was not worked out in detail.

The Great Patriotic War was a testing of the main provisions of the prewar views on the preparation and conduct of defensive operations. Some of these were not taken up while others were adjusted and reworked, for example, the width of the defensive zone, the depth of the operational configuration and the methods of going over to the defensive; others (rather few) such as the operational configuration of the troops, the maneuvering of forces, underwent further development and became part and parcel of armed combat practices.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Boevaya sluzhba pekhoty. Rukovodstvo dlya komandnogo sostava RKKA" [Combat Service of Infantry. Manual for RKKA Command Personnel], Moscow, Izd. Vysshego voyennogo redsoвета, 1924, pp 120-121.
2. Ibid., p 121.
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4. "Polevoy ustav RKKA (PU-29)" [RKKA Field Manual (PU-29)], Moscow-Leningrad, Gosizdat, Otdel voyennoy literatury, 1931, p 87.
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USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS BY AMERICAN TROOPS IN LOCAL WARS IN INDOCHINA (1961-1971)

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 87 (signed to press 23 Dec 86) pp 54-58

[Article by Col A.G. Georgiyev, candidate of technical sciences; the article was written from materials in the foreign press and published under the rubric "Local Wars"]

[Text] In the aggressive plans for winning world domination, American imperialism has placed a major emphasis on weapons of mass destruction. Here Pentagon specialists are giving more and more attention to chemical weapons which the American military tested out in the aggressive war in Korea (1950-1953) and widely employed in the war in Indochina and other local wars.(1)

The chemical warfare initiated by the United States in Indochina in 1961 has had no equal in history in terms of the scale, fierceness and severe consequences for people, the animal and plant world and for the environment as a whole.

For the first time in the history of waging wars, American troops in Indochina used chemical agents for conducting military operations not only against troop contingents. The main objectives of the chemical attack were children, women, the elderly, domesticated livestock, grain crops, fruit and industrial crops, valuable varieties of trees, the mangrove forests, forest and aquatic fauna. Mankind has encountered unpunished acts of genocide and ecocide, that is, the attempt to consciously destroy the population and environment of an entire area. Some 1.3 million persons(3) have suffered from the employment of this type of weapon in South Vietnam alone (for comparison: in World War I all belligerents employed 124,000 tons of toxins from which 1.3 million persons also suffered but not the peaceful population, as in South Vietnam, but the troop contingent of all the fighting armies; some 91,000 soldiers and officers were killed by toxins(4)).

Enormous harm to the agrarian countries of Indochina (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, now Kampuchea) was caused by the wide-scale use of herbicides -- chemical agents for injuring vegetation -- by the aggressors. Vietnamese scientists have estimated that the total amount of chemicals employed just in



their country exceeds 100,000 tons, including around 9,000 tons of irritants.(5)

American militaristic circles have not concealed that they began preparing to destroy crops by using chemicals in the event of the initiating of a war by the United States (as in certain other capitalist countries) immediately after the end of World War I. Later on, the Pentagon studied the experience of the employment of herbicides by Great Britain in Malaya at the beginning of the 1950s, and in 1952 tested and purchased the butyl esters of 2, 4-D and 2, 4, 5-T (di- and trichlorophenoxyacetic acids) as effective agents for destroying plantings and vegetation.(6) The tasks, aims and methods of employing herbicides were set out in the American field manual FM 3-3 "Tactical Employment of Herbicides" worked out in the course of the aggression in South Vietnam. The basic aim in employing these chemical formulas was to destroy the production base and undermine the agrarian economy of the nation, that is, an attempt to carry out the strategic tasks of the war by cheap chemical means. Moreover, the use of herbicides helped to successfully decamouflage and disclose the subunits of the People's Liberation Forces in the forests and jungles, to clear sectors of fire and airfields, to destroy forests and brush along roads, communications lines and around installations in the aim of preventing ambushes and surprise attacks by patriots.(7)

The program approved by the White House at the end of 1961 for employing herbicides in Indochina was given the code name Operation Ranch Hand. Arbitrarily one can establish three stages in this operation (cynically called a "ranch hand"). In the first stage (1961-1964), the herbicide formulas were chosen. In the second (1965-1969), the basic task of Operation Ranch Hand was carried out, that is, the destroying of the agrarian sectors of the national economy and the destruction of the region's ecosystem.

Around 90 percent of all the herbicides employed in the war was used during this period. In the third stage the herbicides were employed in South Vietnam only in 1970-1971 on comparatively small areas. The Saigon puppet troops continued Operation Ranch Hand up until 1975.

The most effective were considered to be the continuous action herbicides known under the code name Orange (n-butyl esters of 2, 4-D and 2, 4, 5-T in a ratio of 1:1), White (a mixture of Diisopropanolamine of 2, 4-D and pycloham in a ratio of 8:2) and Blue (a sodium salt of dimethylarsenic acid).(8) Preference was given to the Orange formula which contained a highly toxic impurity of dioxin (2, 3, 7, 8-tetrachlordibensoparadionxine) and this was employed for about 80 percent of the total weight of herbicides used in South Vietnam.

Herbicides were applied to an area of around 28,000 square km with a rate of from 15-20 to 300 kg per hectare and more.(9) The MC-1 aviation sprayer with a capacity of 3,780 liters (1,000 gallons) was the basic technical device for applying herbicides. The sprayer was mounted on the C-123 transport aircraft and its modifications the IC-123 and IC-123K.(10)

Grain crops were systematically destroyed on a significant portion of the cultivated area. As a result of the effect of high concentrations of

herbicides on the soil, approximately 1.3 million hectares of arable land cannot be used to grow agricultural crops. The rubber tree plantations have been almost completely destroyed as well as the valuable mangrove forests and 30 percent of the flatland forests. A significant amount of wild and domesticated animals and birds perished.

A group of researchers under the leadership of Prof Wo Quay from Hanoi University submitted convincing, comparative data on the habitat of animals and birds in jungle areas which had been sprayed and unsprayed by herbicides 10 years after the war. In the sprayed A Luoi Valley, around 24 species of birds and 5 species of mammals were found, while in two unsprayed control areas of jungles (on equal areas) there were 145 and 170 species of birds and 30 and 35 species of mammals, respectively.(11) The forests after being treated with this type of chemical weapon were burned with napalm. The areas liberated in this manner were sown with special grasses which completely excluded the possibility of restoring the tropical vegetation. Along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, for example, on the site of mountain forests, during rainy season, additional downpours were artificially caused contributing to the washing away and rapid erosion of the soil.

The danger of the large-scale employment of herbicides in Indochina, particularly their entry into the human organism (on a per capita base in South Vietnam, excluding Saigon, there were 16.3 liters of herbicides(12)) and animals has not yet been fully assessed by scientists. Admixtures of the already mentioned dioxin sharply increase this. The great harm caused by dioxin has been confirmed by the widely described instance of an explosion at a plant of the Swiss Hoffman Laroche firm in Seveso (Italy, 1976) with the release of 2.5 kg of this substance. On an extensive area around the site of the explosion, birds and animals perished and thousands of people were evacuated from the danger zone while 5,000 persons were recorded with intoxication.(13)

In possessing high toxicity, dioxin strongly afflicts human organs. Even insignificant doses of it cause the skin disease of acne, cancers of the liver, running eyes and cause injury to the hereditary apparatus and are the cause of birth defects. In addition, dioxin is very long-lasting. Under natural conditions it lasts around 20 years, through the ground water it penetrates rivers and seas and accumulates in the organisms of fishes and animals. Dioxin is destroyed by burning at a temperature of around 800 degrees C.(14) The amount of dioxin in Vietnam as a result of chemical warfare, according to various estimates, is 170-500 kg.(15) Such an accumulation, having caused enormous injuries, has doomed the nation's population to extended suffering. It is not surprising that the participants of conferences and symposiums on the consequences of chemical warfare in Vietnam have pointed out the extensive distribution of liver illnesses among the people, disruptions of the central nervous system, the reproductive organs and changes in the composition of blood and immune systems.

The use of chemical weapons in Vietnam also told on the health of American soldiers and their "colleagues" who participated in Operation Ranch Hand. By 1982, according to the data of Western researchers, around 17,000 American veterans from the "Dirty War" in Indochina, 4,000 Australians as well as 4,700

New Zealand and South Korean soldiers had begun a court case against the companies producing herbicides for use in Southeast Asia. A total of 40,000 children with physical defects were born in the families of soldiers returning from the battlefields in the Mekong Delta, on the plains of Cambodia and the mountains of Laos and who were exposed to the chemical in the air.(16)

In addition to the herbicides employed for strategic and tactical purposes, for carrying out a number of tactical tasks, the Americans widely employed irritants in South Vietnam. Of these the most effective was considered to be the substance CS (orthochlorobenzalmononitril) in the form of a formula of increased stability under the conditions of a tropical region: CS-1 and CS-2.

In addition to the indications of irritation (tearing, attacks of coughing and abundant secretion from the nose), this substance causes intolerable pain upon inhalation. According to the estimates of specialists, the U.S. Department of the Army purchased and employed in Vietnam around 9,000 tons of the CS substance. Its combat concentrations are around 1 mg per liter and the consumption rate sufficient for contaminating areas of terrain is from 1 to 10 kg per hectare.(17) The CS substance also damages vegetation but, in the opinion of foreign specialists, is less effective than herbicides. Its employment in an enclosed space by using the Mighty Mite units for forcing the CS powder into the underground tunnels where the peaceful inhabitants and soldiers of the South Vietnam Liberation Army were hiding, often led to fatalities.

For employing CS by aviation, artillery and ground troops in Vietnam, the Americans developed and introduced around 20 types of ammunition with this substance. The methods of employment and the consumption rates of this ammunition as well as the tasks and aims of their employment were initially determined by a technical circular and later by a special field manual FM 3-2 (the Americans call it a "field manual").(18)

The manual emphasizes that chemical ammunition with CS are an important supplement to conventional types of weapons and should be employed for carrying out such tactical missions as smoking the enemy out of engineer structures with the subsequent taking prisoner or annihilation (these were employed most widely), the conducting of troop reconnaissance and the detection of ambushes, the capturing of weapons or prisoners, the wearing down of the enemy and the forcing of it from a certain region, contaminating roads, areas of terrain and installations for an extended time, strengthening the defenses of installations and firing points, avoiding the pursuing enemy and so forth.

The Australian scientist J. McCallock, a co-worker at the National University, in his book "The Policy of Agent Orange" published in 1984 equates the consequences of Operation Ranch Hand and the employment of irritants in Vietnam to the detonating of the American atomic bomb over Hiroshima and feels that by this act the United States wants to legitimize the employment of chemical weapons in the future and force the Americans to think that there are no moral obstacles in the given question.(19)

Also indicative is one of the conclusions of an International Scientific Conference held on 12-13 December 1970 at Orsay (Paris) on chemical warfare in Vietnam: if one assesses the effectiveness of weapons as the cost of the damage caused to the cost of producing the weapon which has provided this damage, then chemical weapons, in terms of the results of employing herbicides in South Vietnam, surpass the effectiveness of nuclear weapons by a magnitude of 3-5. (20)

It is essential to emphasize that in local wars the American aggressors have as yet employed far from all the agents in their chemical arsenal. This is based upon 55,000 tons of lethal neuromuscular toxins (sarin, VX) and ammunition for them (over 20 types with a total weight of around 150,000 tons or 3 million units). (21) There is scarcely any consolation in the fact that the Americans in their numerous local wars have never switched from the use of "non-lethal" toxins (the classification is very arbitrary) to the use of fatal toxins.

At present, one is struck by the planned, purposeful execution of numerous measures by the Pentagon to improve its chemical warfare potential, including: the modernizing and building up of the chemical warfare arsenal including the transition to a binary weapons system and the bringing of the total number of chemical ammunition (according to the plan) from 3 million to 5 million units. (22) Diverse manuals and regulations are being worked out and turned over to the troops on employing chemical weapons and defense against them, and the troops and command personnel are being trained intensely to fight under the conditions of the employment of this type of weapon. There has been a change in the views on the employment of chemical weapons with a transition from a concept of a retaliatory strike for enemy aggression to initiative in beginning a chemical war. In all these measures the Pentagon widely employs the combat experience gained in employing chemical weapons in the aggressive wars in Indochina.

Special attention should be given to the diversity of scientific research carried out to find new effective toxins, herbicides, defoliants and the equipment and methods of their employment. In the interests of the Pentagon this research is being conducted by scores of military institutions, around 60 universities and a number of other American scientific research facilities as well as many institutes, universities and research laboratories in Great Britain, Canada, West Germany, the Netherlands and Japan. (23)

Regardless of the sharp protests of the world community, the United States and its allies continue to test highly toxic chemical substances in the open environment. Thus, in 1981-1984, in the north of Brazil the American Dow Chemical, the Japanese Agromax Firm and the Brazilian military company Capemi, under the pretext of clearing an area of jungles for building a hydropower plant, on an area of 2,400 square km tested the effectiveness of two new highly toxic herbicides. As a result on this area, not only thousands of unique species of plants and animals perished but also two Indian tribes with over 7,000 persons were eradicated. (24)

The given facts show that in the area of military chemistry, the United States is intensifying its offensive potential. It has become maneuverable and

multipurpose. The U.S. chemical warfare potential is a means for achieving the predatory aims of imperialism in large and small wars. The struggle of the Soviet Union for the complete banning and destruction of chemical weapons is supported by all peace-loving forces of the world and is a powerful restraining factor on the American aggressive plans.

#### FOOTNOTES

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## EMPLOYMENT OF SUBMARINES IN INTEREST OF CONDUCTING RECONNAISSANCE

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[Article by Capt 1st Rank V.P. Alekseyev, candidate of military sciences, published under the rubric "World War II"]

[Text] The experience of World War II has shown that submarines, in possessing covertness and relatively great range, along with operations on enemy sealanes could also successfully carry out many other missions. Here, in contrast to the submarines of a majority of the navies of other belligerents, Soviet submarines operated, as a rule, in limited areas of the seas with comparatively shallow depths, under the conditions of a well-developed enemy antisubmarine defense (primarily in the Baltic). The results of their operations, including for reconnaissance purposes, were influenced by the extended unfavorable situation on the land theater of military operations which worsened the basing conditions as well as the shortage of both their own (submarine) as well as supporting forces (surface ships, aviation) and so forth. For these reasons, the Soviet submarines, in comparison with the submarines of other navies, were used rather rarely for conducting reconnaissance. Their role in carrying out reconnaissance missions was limited to transmitting reports to the staffs on enemy movements in those areas where the submarines were conducting combat operations as well as the landing of reconnaissance groups.

At the same time there was much that was similar in the organizing of reconnaissance carried out by the submarines of different navies. This was explained by the established uniform views on the use of the subs for reconnaissance purposes. In the opinion of the naval command of the belligerents, the conducting of reconnaissance by submarines was considered for the latter to be a supporting type of combat. In individual instances, this makes it possible to view the employment of submarines for conducting reconnaissance in an aggregate.

Thus, the use of submarines in the interests of conducting reconnaissance occurred in a system of daily combat activities of the naval forces. Here the submarines were given the following missions: ascertaining the forming areas of convoys; determining the tactics of the security and support forces, the routes and intensity of ship and vessel traffic in the various regions of the

seas and oceans and the system for defending the sealanes; collecting information on the lines of antisubmarine defense and the nature of activities of the antisubmarine forces within them; observation of the coast, bases and ports; ascertaining the forces and determining the nature of the organization of antilanding defenses and so forth.

In a majority of instances the submarines combined the conducting of reconnaissance with the carrying out of the main mission but sometimes the detecting of the enemy and the reporting on the nature of its operations comprised the chief content of their combat trips. With the start of the Great Patriotic War the submarines were our first forces to deploy for combat at sea. Here a significant portion of them was given the mission of detecting formations of enemy large ships and landing forces and ascertaining the enemy's intentions.

For conducting reconnaissance at sea, the ships employed sonars and radars, radio direction finders, radio reconnaissance equipment and passive search radar instruments. Both the listed as well as other equipment made it possible to intercept enemy reports, to get a fix on the ship radio transmitters and detect the operation of active radio-technical [radar] devices. Also successfully employed were visual devices for observing and fixing the targets (periscopes, binoculars, cameras), particularly when the submarines were located in narrows, straits zones, in key areas of the sealanes and in waters adjacent to ports and basins.

In conducting reconnaissance the submarines operated, as a rule, individually, carrying out extended and covert observance of the situation in the designated areas. Most often the data were secured by them in their own interests and coincided with the search for and destruction of the targets. The submarine S-7 (Baltic Fleet) in just one trip from 2 July through 12 August 1942, discovered three convoys and four individual targets. For this it had to conduct a search with a periodic shifting of position to the north of Kalmarstrait, in the area of Ventspils and Akmenrags and Uzhava beacons. As a result, S-7 was able to sink four transports and for this all the crew members were awarded orders and the submarine commander, Capt 3d Rank S.P. Lisin, received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. (1)

The conducting of reconnaissance by the subs for their own needs was a forced measure and explained either by the limited capabilities of other forces in securing data on the sea enemy (primarily aviation) or by the particular features of the sealanes and the increased defense of the latter by the enemy. For example, a sector of the northern sealanes (from Tromso to Mageryo Island) around 180 miles long and which the individual German transports crossed predominantly through the skerries under the protection of shore batteries, during the first period of the Great Patriotic War was actually accessible only to submarines. This is why the data collected by the submarines on the situation on the enemy sealanes in this area were employed unilaterally.

Information received during combat or reconnaissance trips of the submarines was analyzed and generalized on the staffs and then issued to commanders of other ships. This widened the opportunities for an effective search for enemy

convoys and individual transports and increased the effectiveness of submarine operations. On 16 August 1941, M-154 (Northern Fleet, commander, Capt-Lt N.Ye. Yegorov) carried out a reconnaissance trip into the Petsamovuono Fjord. The submarine established that the enemy submarine defenses were weak here and it was possible to break through to the Port of Linakhamari for destroying the transports and combat vessels located here. In using these data as well as its own observations, M-172 (commander, Capt-Lt I.I. Fisanovich) on 21 August broke into the port and attacked a transport unloading there.(2)

Submarines were also employed for conducting reconnaissance in the interests of other forces. In August 1942, the heavy cruiser of the German Navy "Admiral Scheer" was given the mission of attacking the Soviet Arctic sealanes and ports. Two submarines were sent out to provide the cruiser with intelligence data on the operational and ice situation in the Kara Sea: U-601 to the northern extremity of Novaya Zemlya and U-251 to the area between Belyy and Dikson Islands. They generally carried out their mission, but the command which conducted this operation did not fully use the capabilities of the submarines. Thus, the submarines did not ascertain the situation in Port Dikson and the cruiser, without having sufficient data on the nature of the port's defenses, did not carry out the task set for it.(3)

Reconnaissance was carried out by submarines not only on enemy sealanes but also in the area of the passage of their own ships and vessels. In the course of conducting the operation against the American Fleet at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese carrier task force which left Hitokappu Bay (Kuril Islands) on 26 November 1941, for conducting reconnaissance along its course used three submarines. The submarines kept a distance of around 200 miles ahead of the main forces and ensured a covert approach of the latter to the ultimate destination.(4) In escorting Allied convoys to the northern ports of the Soviet Union, submarines were turned to the approaches of enemy bases, having the task of promptly informing the command of the setting to sea by enemy surface ships. The carrying out of this mission in its nature was analogous to the standing of patrol duty, since in either instance the submarines not only observed the enemy forces but also when necessary engaged its ships in combat. On 5 July 1942, K-21 (commander, Capt 2d Rank N.A. Lunin) detected an enemy squadron consisting of the battleship "Tirpitz," the heavy cruisers "Admiral Hipper" and "Admiral Scheer," seven destroyers and two patrol boats in the area to the north of Hammerfest which had been secretly sent against the Allied convoy PQ-17. On the same day the task force was spotted by an English submarine. The radiograms of the two subs to their commands as well as the torpedo attack by K-21 against the "Tirpitz" forced the squadron to return to Altenfjord due to the loss of surprise.(5)

The reconnaissance data gained by submarines assumed the greatest reliability and value when these were supplemented and confirmed by information gained from other sources. Only a careful analysis of all the data made it possible to know the actual situation in the theater or its individual sector and take effective measures to thwart the enemy's plans. For this purpose attempts were repeatedly taken to organize cooperation between the submarines conducting reconnaissance and aviation. In March 1941, an English submarine to the east of Sicily discovered several groups of Italian ships which had come out of their bases to attack the English convoys in the eastern

Mediterranean. The data gained by the submarine made it possible for the English to conduct effective air reconnaissance and promptly take measures not only to securely cover their convoys but also defeat the enemy. The English forces (ships and torpedo aircraft), having anticipated the actions of the enemy ships, imposed battle on the latter off Cape Matapan and caused the Italians great losses. (6)

Cooperation between aviation, submarines, surface vessels and shore radio technical posts was also organized in the Soviet Navy. In 1944, because of the change in our favor (in comparison with German aviation) in the general situation in the air, the increased number of reconnaissance aircraft and the equipping of these with more advanced communications as well as the arming of submarines with extendable periscope antennas, the capabilities for carrying this out were somewhat widened. Having received the initial data at periscope depth from aircraft, adjacent submarines and shore posts, the submarines carried out a final reconnaissance both for themselves and in the interests of other forces. Such cooperation was organized rather clearly by the Command of the Pacific Fleet in 1945 in the course of combat operations against militaristic Japan. Twelve submarines (4 off the coast of North Korea, 6 on the approaches to Peter the Great Bay and 2 off the western coasts of Southern Sakhalin), in cooperating with aviation and surface vessels, operated on the enemy sealanes and also conducted reconnaissance in the aim of promptly detecting the approach of enemy ships and vessels with reserves to the combat areas of our ground troops. The set mission was carried out particularly well by the submarines Shch-117 and Shch-119 which conducted reconnaissance on the approaches to Southern Sakhalin and the island of Hokkaido. (7)

In extensive maritime areas and in the open sea the submarines most often conducted reconnaissance as part of groups. In truth, for our Navy such operation were least indicative. This was explained by the geographic conditions of the maritime theaters, by the particular features of the enemy sealanes which ran chiefly off the coast, by the presence of our own forces and the state of enemy antisubmarine defenses and by the technical capabilities of the subs. The Northern Fleet attempted the group employment of submarines (including for reconnaissance purposes) in 1943, after receiving the Drakon sonars making it possible to maintain contact between submerged subs at a distance of up to 50 cable lengths. However, the imperfection of these devices did not make it possible to achieve the expected results. The small number of subs in the Northern Fleet also substantially reduced the opportunity for their group employment. Even by the start of 1945, the number of submarines here reached 17-23 units. (8) At the same time, the enemy naval forces based in Northern Norway had 30-35 submarines. (9)

In conducting reconnaissance by the group method, the submarines remained in screens. The interval between the boats was set, as a rule, at not more than double the detection range of the targets using visual observation devices. In truth, the data secured in an extensive area was not always marked by great accuracy. Most often the mistake occurred in identifying, classifying and determining the number of targets. This was explained by the insufficient equipping of the submarines with radar reconnaissance (RTR) equipment, by the short detection ranges of the sonar sets and by the poor cooperation of the submarines with air reconnaissance.

The extensive introduction of radar into the fleets made it possible to equip the submarines with radar search receivers and this significantly increased not only the reconnaissance capabilities of the submarines but also the enemy tracking time. The covertness of the submarine reconnaissance actions was also improved. In September 1943, a group of 20 German submarines (Leuthen) was operating against the Allied convoys. They were all equipped with the Hegenuk Wanze radio reconnaissance equipment which detected the operation of enemy radars in the centimeter frequency band.(10)

Valuable information on the enemy was secured by the reconnaissance-sabotage groups which were frequently landed from submarines. Over the period of World War II, the Americans, for example, used more than 40 submarines for this purpose. The groups landed by them on the coast of the African states and numerous Pacific islands ascertained the situation in individual areas, created tension in the enemy rear and distracted enemy forces from the main sectors. Sometimes they independently carried out tactical missions. On 8 August 1942, two U.S. submarines, the "Nautilus" and "Argonaut," landed on Makin-Meang Island (the Gilbert Islands) 222 marines which destroyed the island garrison (90 men), a thousand barrels of aviation gasoline, dumps and the main radio. After this the saboteurs returned to the submarines which brought them back to Pearl Harbor. Thus, a tactical mission was carried out of diverting the enemy's attention from the operations on the Solomon Islands and valuable information was also collected.(11)

In a majority of instances, the landing of reconnaissance and sabotage special groups was combined with the carrying out of tasks to disrupt enemy sealanes and the conduct of independent reconnaissance in an area. On 11 August 1941, Shch-211 (Black Sea Fleet, submarine commander, Capt-Lt A.D. Devyatko) landed a group of Bulgarian internationalist revolutionaries headed by Tsvyatko Nikolov Radoynov in the area of Varna. On the fourth day after this, it torpedoed and sank to the northeast of Cape Emine the transport "Peles" with a tonnage of 5,708 gross tons.(12) On 5 January 1942, S-102 (Northern Fleet, submarine commander, Capt-Lt L.I. Gorodnichiy), after landing a reconnaissance group on the coast of Persfjord, headed to an area of expected enemy convoy traffic. Here it collected valuable information and also sank three transports: on 10 January the "Walter Olrogge" off Cape Harbaken, on 14 January the "Turkheim" and "Fegervik" in the northern part of the Sulterfjord. In resting on the bottom and escaping pursuit, on 18 January the S-102 removed the previously landed reconnaissance group from the shore and returned to base with it.(13)

In World War II (particularly in the second half of it), there was significant development in the special forces for attacking ships at anchor in roadsteads and at bases (pygmy submarines, human torpedoes and underwater demolition men) who were brought to the place of action by submarines. Often their actions were analogous to a reconnaissance in force. Practice showed the advisability of employing these forces which made it possible, when combined with covert appearance in a set area with the aid of a submarine, to effectively influence the enemy with small material outlays, to cause increased tension in the enemy antisubmarine defenses and antisabotage actions and gain complete information on the presence of naval and other forces in the roadsteads and bases.



The landing of reconnaissance and sabotage groups by submarines often was carried out in the aim of supporting the landing of amphibious forces. Here the submarines themselves conducted reconnaissance of the enemy coast. Thus, American submarines during the period from 1942 through 1945, in the course of preparing for landing operations, made 75 combat trips for reconnoitering the coast and approaches to enemy ports and bases and landed 45 reconnaissance-sabotage groups. (14)

For ascertaining the nature of the enemy antilanding defenses (their width, depth, engineer equipment and fire power), air flight operations from coastal airfields, the system of troop movements and so forth, submarines were sent to sea both before the compiling of the plan for the landing operation as well as in the course of working it out in the aim of rechecking and clarifying information. In the course of preparing for the Kerch-Feodosiya Landing Operation, submarines from the Black Sea Fleet in December 1941, in operating against the coastal enemy sealanes, also conducted reconnaissance on the coast of the Kerch Peninsula. As a result of the extended observation of the coastal strip, they gained valuable information on the system of the enemy antilanding defenses. They established the locations of permanent firing emplacements, minefields, observation posts and so forth. In addition, one submarine was sent directly to the Feodosiya area with the specific assignment of conducting reconnaissance. For example, it was to detect the presence of boom and net obstacles at the entrance to the port. (15)

At times, a significant number of submarines was involved for conducting reconnaissance in the interests of a successful landing. For example, in the course of the landing operation to capture the island of Iwo Jima (16 February -- 25 March 1945), the Americans employed submarines to prevent the approach of Japanese forces to the landing area from different directions. Great hopes were placed on submarines in conducting the landing operation to capture Leyte Island (20 October -- 25 December 1944). On the distant approaches to the landing area, 29 submarines were deployed in two echelons. (16) The first operated along the coast off all the most important enemy bases and the second on the western approaches to the Philippine Archipelago. Their main mission was to conduct reconnaissance in the aim of detecting enemy naval forces and reporting their appearance on threatening sectors to their command. In addition, they also observed and collected information on the movement of enemy ships on the approaches to Japanese bases. The submarines justified the hopes placed on them and they not only promptly detected Japanese ships moving to the area of Leyte Island and prevented their antilanding actions, but also caused them harm. Thus, the submarines "Darter" and "Dace" which were searching between the northeastern coast of the island of Borneo and the island of Palawan, on 22 October 1944, established contact with the central group of Japanese forces and for a long time observed it, transmitting the obtained data to the commander of the 3d Fleet of the American Navy and then attacked the Japanese ships. Two heavy cruisers, the "Agato" and "Maya" were sunk by submarine torpedoes and a third, the "Takao" sustained significant damage and was forced to return to base. (17)

Often the submarines did not cease their reconnaissance activities in the landing of forces and their actions off the coast. At times they were also



employed in the role of beacon ships for designating safe approaches reconnoitered by them to the coast. For this purpose the submarines covertly made their way to the designated points ahead of time, they conducted a final reconnaissance of the situation, and then up to the designated time rested on the bottom. With the onset of darkness they surfaced and gave light signals in the established sector using searchlights with a set of different colored glasses for the approaching ships and vessels with the landing force. After the landing of the subunits and units on the coast and with the start of combat for the beachhead, the submarines moved off shore for conducting reconnaissance. For example, submarines were employed at the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942 in the course of the Kerch-Feodosiya Landing Operation. The accuracy and safety of the approach of the landing ships to the port of Feodosiya was ensured by Shch-201 (at the distant approaches) and M-51 (some 50 cable lengths from the entry to the port). Shch-203 in the area of Mount Opuk conducted reconnaissance in the interests of an auxiliary landing force.

Thus, in the course of combat at sea and in the maritime areas during the years of the Great Patriotic War and World War II, submarines were successfully employed in the interests of conducting reconnaissance. The effectiveness of their actions here was achieved primarily by the covert approach of the submarines to the defended coast or installation. This is why in addition to independent reconnaissance missions the submarines also carried out support missions. For example, they were used as transports for carrying and delivering reconnaissance-sabotage assault forces, special groups and underwater demolition equipment.

The results of the reconnaissance carried out by submarines was significantly influenced by the geographic conditions of the ocean and sea areas, by the general situation both in these areas and in the theaters of operations, by the nature of enemy actions and the state of its antisubmarine defenses, by the number of submarines and their technical equipping. Even sporadic cooperation of submarines with aviation, surface vessels, and shore radio technical posts was effective and in the course of this intelligence information could be exchanged, clarified and generalized.

Since reconnaissance was conducted by submarines sporadically in the course of their daily combat activities, and largely for their own interests, the intelligence data secured by the submarines were insignificant in the total volume of information concerning the enemy and received by the naval staffs of the belligerents from other various sources. But these data were valuable in their soundness and reliability.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. TsVMA [Central Naval Archives], folio 18, file 40015, sheets 255-261.
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5. "Boyevaya letopis Voyenno-Morskogo Flota. 1941-1942" [Combat Chronicle of the Navy. 1941-1942], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1983, p 79.
6. "Istoriya voyenno-morskogo...", pp 197, 198.
7. TsvMA, folio 129, file 17704, sheet 21.
8. Ibid., folio 112, file 12701, sheet 10; file 11033, sheet 1; file 11344, sheet 1.
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11. "Morskoy atlas. Voyenno-istoricheskiy" [Naval Atlas. Military History], Moscow, Izd. Glavnogo shtaba VMF, Vol III, Part 2, 1966, sheet 30.
12. TsvMA, folio 118, file 5496, sheets 55 verso-112; folio 32, file 1970, sheets 55-57.
13. Ibid., folio 11, file 117, sheets 9-11; folio 112, file 1497, sheets 311, 312.
14. T. Roscoe, "Boyevyye deystviya podvodnykh lodok SShA vo vremya vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [United States Submarine Operations in World War II], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1957, pp 467-480.
15. See: V.I. Achkasov and N.B. Pavlovich, "Sovetskoye voyenno-morskoye iskusstvo v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne" [Soviet Naval Art in the Great Patriotic War], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1973, p 130.
16. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 9, 1978, p 311.
17. "Istoriya voyenno-morskogo...", pp 483, 484.

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## COOPERATION OF REGULAR SOVIET TROOPS WITH PARTISAN FORMATIONS DURING EASTERN FRONT OFFENSIVE IN 1919-1920

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[Article by Col (Ret) A.M. Ageyev, candidate of historical sciences, docent and published under the rubric "Scientific Papers and Information"]

[Text] On 7 January 1920, the offensive of the Eastern Front terminated and this was the final stage in the Red Army's fight against the Kolchak Armed Forces in the aim of eliminating the Kolchak revolt and liberating the industrial Urals and grain-raising Siberia.

One of the particular features of this offensive was the close cooperation of the regular Soviet troops and the rebel partisan formations of the Urals and Siberia. The nature of this cooperation was determined by the common military-political aims and tasks carried out jointly by the Red Army and the partisans upon the instructions of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee, the Soviet government headed by V.I. Lenin and the military leadership bodies. It was based upon the Leninist thesis that the partisan movement is an important but auxiliary factor and that it "should be correlated with the main means of combat...."(1)

All the decrees of the party Central Committee, the SNK [Council of People's Commissars], the directives of the RVSR [Republic Revolutionary-Military Council], the decisions of the party organizations of the Urals and Siberia, the directives of the front's command and the orders to the armies were worked out considering the instructions of V.I. Lenin on the cooperation of the main means of combat with such a means as partisan warfare. Of great importance were the decrees of the Third Siberian Oblast Underground Bolshevik Conference on organizing a partisan war in the Kolchak rear (March 1919) and the instructions worked out by the conference; the Decree of the United Session of the Politburo and Orgburo of the RKP(b) Central Committee of 19 July 1919 on establishing major partisan detachments and coordinating their actions among themselves as well as with the Red Army; the Appeal of the All-Russian VTsIK [Central Executive Committee] and the SNK to the Siberian workers of 16 August 1919 as well as other documents.

The questions of cooperation between the Red Army regular troops and the partisans were resolved by the RVS [Revolutionary Military Council] of the front and armies together with the leadership bodies of the partisan-rebel movement in the Urals and in Siberia as well as with the commanders of the partisan detachments. In the east of the republic, the partisan movement was led through the underground party organizations of the Siberian Bureau of the RKP(b) Central Committee and its departments: the Southern under the RVS of the 5th Army and the Northern under the RVS of the 3d Army. In the Urals, such leadership was provided through the Chelyabinsk party organization which combined 30 underground Bolshevik committees and in Siberia by the Omsk under which were 23 committees. The underground party committees obliged all the partisan detachments to inform them of their combat activities, they gave them tasks and issued the necessary instructions.

One of the members of the Siberian Bureau of the Central Committee (I.N. Smirnov) was simultaneously a member of the RVS of the 5th Army of the Eastern Front which was advancing on the main axis, to Zlatoust, Chelyabinsk, Omsk, Krasnoyarsk. The command and the political bodies of the front, the armies and the divisions, in organizing cooperation, issued orders to the commanders of the partisan detachments and sent their own representatives to the detachments.

The forms and methods of cooperation of the regular Soviet units with the partisans depended upon the conditions of armed combat, the particular features of the theater of operations and the scope of the partisan-rebel movement.

During the period of the fighting for the Urals (21 June-4 August 1919), in conducting the Perm, Zlatoust, Yekterinburg and Chelyabinsk Offensive Operations, cooperation of the 5th, 2d and 3d Armies of the front with the Urals partisans had predominantly an operational-tactical nature. In the mountainous wooded areas of the Southern, Middle and Northern Urals, hundreds of small- and medium-sized partisan detachments, sabotage and reconnaissance groups were operating with a total number of up to 10,000 men.(2) One of the important forms of their actions was the collecting of intelligence information on the Kolchak troops, the condition of their rear, the organization of defense of the population points in the interests of the Red Army. Such data through the underground party groups and the special foot scouts of the Siberian Bureau were sent to the staffs of the front and the armies and employed by them in planning the offensive operations.

In the middle of the summer of 1919, the Siberian Bureau moved several underground groups of communists across the front line into the Kolchak rear for establishing contact with the partisans and for reconnoitering the enemy. In the Southern and Middle Urals, these were the communists G.L. Gudyrev with his wife, F.F. Vozhakov, I.S. Belostotskiy, D.T. Bogatov and others, and in the Middle Urals, a group of six persons headed by V.P. Usatov. All in all, in July-August there were several such special groups and foot scouts operating in the Urals.

The Siberian Bureau moved sabotage groups across the front line into the enemy rear for destroying individual sectors of the railroad, bridges, for blowing

up dumps and disrupting telephone and telegraph communications. Special "detachments," stated the plan for organizing the military subsection of the department of the Siberian Bureau of the RKP(b) Central Committee, "maintain constant contact with the military subsection and are working according to the plan elaborated for them." (3) Certain sabotage groups served as a basis for new partisan detachments. Thus, the cavalry detachment of the communist P.B. Gusakov which was moved by the Siberian Bureau across the front line to the area of the Asha-Balashov plant on the eve of the offensive, soon grew into the strong Asha-Balashov partisan detachment operating in the area of the Samara-Zlatoust Railroad.

In cooperation with the advancing Red Army, the partisan detachments also employed such forms of combat as attacking the Kolchak troop garrisons, capturing population points and holding them until the approach of Soviet troops, as well as joint actions with regular units to capture defensive strongpoints, towns and plants, raids in the enemy rear for preventing the moving up of reinforcements and evacuating valuable equipment of plants.

Thus, in the zone of advance of the 5th Army, its troops cooperated with the Urals (Karabash), Asha-Balashov, Mikhaylov, Minyar, Nizhne-Ufaleya, Sim, Yuryuzan and other partisan detachments. The 24th Rifle Division (division chief, V.I. Pavlovskiy) which was fighting on the right wing of the army, with assistance from the Katav-Ivanovskiy and Yuryuzan partisan detachments and underground party groups, liberated the Avzyano-Petrovskiy, Tirlyan and Yuryuzan plants and occupied the Beloretskiy plant liberated by a partisan meeting attack. The 26th Rifle Division (division chief, G.Kh. Ekhhe), in advancing on the center, in cooperation with the Asha-Balashov detachment of P.B. Guzakov (over 100 men), the Minyar detachment of M.T. Fateyev (up to 300 men) and the Sim detachment of N.A. Maslennikov (up to 200 men) liberated the Asha-Balashov, Minyar and Sim plants. For attacking the town of Sim and the Sim plant, the partisans led a separate cavalry brigade from the 26th Rifle Division over mountain paths into the rear. By joint strikes of the division's units from the front, as well as the partisans and cavalry brigade from the rear, the town and plant were liberated. The Urals (Karabash) detachment under the command of I.M. Prokudin (around 450 men) cooperated with the army's 35th Rifle Division (division chief, L.I. Verman). Having established contact with the command of the 5th Army before the offensive, in the area of Argayash, Karabash, Verkhne-Kyshtymskiy, it put out of operation sections of the railroad, cut down telegraph poles, thereby disrupting the operation of the rear services of the Kolchak Western Army and its contact with the Siberian Army. After the liberation of Karabash, the detachment was incorporated in the 35th Rifle Division.

The Mikhaylov detachment of I.P. Makarov (over 300 men) fought the Kolchak troops on the boundary of the 5th and 3d Armies. In the area of the Nyaze-Petrovskiy and Nizhniye-Sergi plants, the detachment attacked the Kolchak dumps, it derailed trains, it destroyed the White Guard convoys escorting freight and drove them off. Having carried out the tasks set for it, this detachment joined up with the 5th Rifle Division of the 3d Army. Subsequently, jointly with the Soviet troops the partisans pursued the defeated units and eliminated enemy garrisons.



The partisans of the Northern Urals, in assisting the advance of the 2d and 3d Armies of the Eastern Front, prevented the mobilizing of workers and peasants into the Kolchak Siberian Army, they helped the peasants of Yekaterinburg, Shadrinsk and other districts hide cattle and wagons in the forests and they distributed appeals and leaflets among enemy troops which unmasked the antipopular essence of the Kolchak movement and urged the enemy soldiers to go over to the side of the advancing Red Army.

With the approach of Soviet troops to the towns, plants and villages, underground groups and partisans organized uprisings and helped liberate them by attacks from the rear. Thus, the partisan detachment of A.M. Proskurin assisted the cavalry detachment of the 3d Army under the command of M.D. Tomlin in liberating Irbit, the partisan detachment of A.I. Nikitin did the same thing in Nadezhdinsk and Verkhoturys and the detachment of G. Cherepanov, Alapayevsk and the adjacent areas. The Shadrinsk, Kamyshlov and Domatov partisan detachments did the same in the interests of the 29th (division chief, V.F. Grushetskiy) and 30th (division chief, N.D. Kashirin, from 6 August Ye.N. Sergeyev) Rifle Divisions of the 3d Army.

The partisans and the insurgent workers and peasants helped the Red Army to quickly liberate the Urals. On this question V.I. Lenin has written: "...The Red Army, in advancing heroically in the Urals with the aid of the Urals workers who have risen to a man, is approaching Siberia...."(4)

In the stage of the fight for Siberia (5 August 1919 — 7 January 1920), the cooperation of the Red Army with the partisans, because of the increased partisan-rebel movement, assumed a particularly wide scope: it became mass and turned into an important factor accelerating the defeat of the Kolchak armies and the elimination of the Kolchak movement.

At the end of the summer the rear of the Kolchak troops was shaken by revolts and the number of liberated areas and partisan zones and republics increased. To the north of Krasnoyarsk, the Taseyevo partisan republic of Yenisey partisans arose and to the south the Stepnoy Badzhey republic.(5) The Altay partisans liberated an extensive area encompassing the Kamen, Barnaul and Slavgorod Districts. The partisan-rebel movement engulfed Eastern Siberia and the northwestern regions of Irkutsk Province.

The process of uniting the small partisan detachments into large ones was completed and the anti-Kolchak fronts were established which coordinated their combat actions with the Red Army. The partisan formations assumed its organizational structure. Thus, in Krasnoyarsk Province there were operating the Taseyevo and Severo-Kansk Partisan Fronts, in the Altay the Northern, Eastern and Southern and in Eastern Siberia, the Angara Partisan Front. In the Altay, the Siberian Army of Ye.M. Mamontov and I.V. Gromov fought the White Guards in the Uryankhay Kray and later in Minusinsk District, the Severo-Kansk (Stepnoy Badzhey) Partisan Army of A.D. Kravchenko and P.Ye. Shchetinkin was fighting, and in the Gornyy Altay, the 1st Gornyy Altay Brigade and later the division of I.Ya. Tretyak and others.

Soviet power was restored in the liberated areas. Attempts to suppress such areas demanded the diverting of large forces of the Kolchak Army from the



front to the rear. Just in June-July, the Taseyevo partisans diverted up to 20,000 Kolchak troops, the Kravchenko--Shchetinkin Army around 12,000 troops and the Mamontov--Gromov Army up to 15,000 troops.(6)

The growing scope of the partisan-rebel movement ruined the operational-strategic rear of Kolchak, creating conditions for the use of such forms of cooperation as a partisan offensive toward the Red Army and supporting the flanks and boundaries of the Red Army troops. For example, in the Petropavlovsk Operation (20 August -- 4 November), the partisans not only provided the regular troops with intelligence data, carried out sabotage in the Kolchak rear, prevented mobilization and attacked the retreating White Guards but also participated in the operational support for the boundary of the Eastern Front with the Turkestan Front and the right flank of the 5th Army. For this they employed the Troitskiy Fortified Area which, along with fortress troops also included partisan regiments and the Separate Steppe Brigade manned by partisans from the Kustanay Combat Sector, and later the Kokchetav Front Group consisting of the 59th Rifle Division and 13th Cavalry Division and the Steppe and Fortress Brigades.(7) The commander of the 5th Army, M.N. Tukhachevskiy, commented: "Class aspects were widely employed in the adopted system for supporting the army's flanks: partisan detachments were organized and elements which sympathized with Soviet power were provided with weapons...."(8)

During the period of conducting the Petropavlovsk and then the Omsk Operations (14-16 November), the Omsk, Tomsk and Altay partisans went over to an offensive to meet up with the Red Army. The chief of staff of the Altay Mamontov--Gromov Partisan Army recalled that "the Western Siberian partisan Army operated in the Kolchak rear during days when the Red Army, having liberated Chelyabinsk, was fighting hard along the Tobol River."(9)

The meeting thrusts of the partisans assisted in the rapid offensive of the 5th and 3d Armies in the Omsk Operation (up to 30 km a day), in liberating the main rear base of Kolchak, Omsk, and the capturing by the 27th Rifle Division of the Omsk Garrison numbering 30,000 men.(10)

After the Omsk Operation, the Kolchak Army ceased to exist as an organized force. Its final defeat was carried out in the Novonikolayevsk (20 November -- 16 December) and Krasnoyarsk (18 December -- 7 January) Offensive Operations. In these operations, the forms of cooperation between the Eastern Front troops and the partisans were particularly diverse. Cooperation was coordinated, as a rule, in terms of aims, tasks and time. In entering the combat areas of the partisans, the regular troops established combat contact with them and jointly carried out tactical and operational tasks. From 1 December, the partisans were incorporated in the Red Army and carried out instructions not only from the RVS of the 5th Army (commander, G.Kh. Eykhe, RVS members K.I. Gryunshtein and I.N. Smirnov), but also the orders of the commanders of divisions and brigades. For coordinating the questions of cooperation between the 5th Army and the Western Siberian Mamontov--Gromov Army, a representative was sent to its staff. "In December....," wrote the chief of staff of this army, Ya. Zhigalin, in his memoirs, "we were already operating jointly with the Red Army and under its leadership carried out battle tasks to clear the Kolchak troops out of Western Siberia."(11)

On 29 November, the RVS of the 5th Army established operational contact also with the Severo-Kansk Kravchenko--Shchetinkin Partisan Army and with the Taseyevo partisans. They were sent a directive from the army staff to fight on the sector of the Transsiberian Railroad between Achinsk and Krasnoyarsk and beyond the 50th verst to the east of Krasnoyarsk.

Joint operations of the regular Soviet troops and the partisans commenced at this stage at the end of November, when the right-flank 26th Rifle Division of the 5th Army in the area of the Kulunda Steppe, Slavgorod and Pavlograd came into combat contact with the Western Siberian Mamontov--Gromov Army (25 regiments, around 40,000 men).(12) The 26th Division (division chief, Ya.P. Gaylit), in advancing as the main forces against Karasuk, Kamen, Barnaul, on 10 December by an assault from the west in cooperation with the partisans advancing from the south and southeast, captured Barnaul, the important railroad junction of the Altay. The 1st Brigade of the division consisting of the Semipalatinsk Army Group together with partisans advanced on Pavlodar, Semipalatinsk, Sergiopol, carrying out the task of operational support for the army right flank together with the Steppe Brigade which had been incorporated in the Kokchetav Group.(13) Actually the entire Mamontov--Gromov Army participated in carrying out the task. Having finally liberated Siberia's granary, Altay Province, in mid-December, the Soviet regular troops and partisans cut the Kolchak Army off from the White Cossacks of the Semirechye [Seven-River Area].

The 5th Army and the Mamontov--Gromov Army here were also assisted by the Kokchetav Group. In advancing against Atbasar, Akmolinsk (Tselinograd) to Lake Balkhash, it together with the Kustanay partisans and the Kazakh Detachment, put an end to Dutov's White Cossack Army and the Kazakh nationalist formations of Alashordinians who were endeavoring to establish operational contact with the Kolchak Army.(14) The operations of the Gornyy Altay partisans were of major importance for ensuring success of the offensive. The 1st Gornyy Altay Partisan Division in cooperation with the Severo-Kansk Kravchenko--Shchetinkin Partisan Army cut the link of Kolchak's troops with Mongolia and the White Guard Army of Ataman Annenkov and deprived the Kolchak troops of the possibility of replenishing their food supplies.

The offensive of the main forces of the 5th Army (27th, 30th and 51st Divisions) were aided by the Tomsk and then the Yenisey partisans. The Tomsk partisans, in coming out of the tayga to the Siberian Main Line and the Siberian Highway and in operating against the flanks of the retreating 2d and 3d Kolchak Armies, helped the 5th Army Divisions liberate Chulym, Tomsk, Mariinsk and other population points. In December, the Tomsk partisan detachments were organized into the 1st Tomsk Partisan Division under the command of V.P. Shevelev and this maintained constant control over the escape route of the Kolchak troops from Novonikolayevsk to Tomsk and Mariinsk, it thwarted their every attempt to dig in on an advantageous line and this accelerated the pursuit of the enemy by the 5th Army.

As a result of the actions of the Tomsk and Yenisey partisans, traffic along the Siberian Railroad and Highway in December was paralyzed, and the tracks were blocked with trains and scattered with corpses of Kolchak troops. Just

along the railroad from Omsk to Tomsk around 10,000 killed White Guards were discovered.(15) In the Kansk area, train traffic was interrupted for 4-7 days. Partisans derailed trains at Achinsk, Tayshet, Klyukvennaya and Kansk Stations.

On 1 January 1920, the 30th Rifle Division (division chief, A.Ya. Lapin) linked up with the Yenisey partisans in the Achinsk area. On 2 January, by joint assaults by the division's units and the partisans, the town was liberated. Five days later, the 30th Rifle Division and the Yenisey partisans entered Krasnoyarsk. The Command of the Eastern Front entrusted the further pursuit of the demoralized and scattered remnants of the Kolchak armies to the Kravchenko--Shchetinkin Army and to the Irkutsk partisans.(16) In the Irkutsk area, the Kolchak troops were finally destroyed.

The close cooperation of the regular Soviet troops with the partisans, in being one of the most vivid and characteristic features of the offensive by the Eastern Front in the summer, autumn and winter of 1919-1920, contributed to the more rapid defeat of the Kolchak Armed Forces and to the liberation of a vast territory of the Urals and Siberia.

In the course of the Red Army offensive, there was tactical, operational and strategic cooperation of the Soviet troops with the partisan formations of the Urals, Siberia and partially Kazakhstan. This was achieved due to the leading role of the RKP(b) in the army, in the Bolshevik underground and among the partisans. The party and military bodies united all the anti-Kolchak forces for achieving the military-political and strategic aims of the offensive.

The forms and methods of cooperation derived from the conditions of the fighting and were subordinate to both the overall aims of the offensive as well as the specific tasks of battle and the operation. Reconnaissance of the enemy, sabotage in its tactical, operational and strategic rear, and strikes by the partisan formations against the lines of communications and the rear military facilities in the aim of disrupting the operation of the rear services, diverting forces from the front, liberating areas and, finally, the offensive by the partisans to link up with the Red Army and joint combat operations of the regular troops and partisans -- all these forms of cooperation during the offensive of the Eastern Front and in each of its operations, as a rule, were coordinated and were of important significance in the final defeat of the Kolchak movement.

The experience of the partisan movement in the Urals and in Siberia and the cooperation of the regular Soviet troops with the partisans was reflected in the manuals and regulations of the Red Army and was employed in the Great Patriotic War.

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3. "Grazhdanskaya voyna na Yuzhnom Urale 1918-1919. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov" [The Civil War in the Southern Urals in 1918-1919. A Collection of Documents and Materials], Chelyabinsk, Knizhnoye Izd-vo, 1962, p 216.
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5. The names of the partisan republics were taken from the names of the villages of Taseyevo and Stepnoy Badzhey.
6. "Za vlast Sovetov. Vospominaniya uchastnikov partizanskogo dvizheniya v tylu u Kolchaka. Dokumenty" [For Soviet Power. Memoirs of Participants in the Partisan Movement in the Kolchak Rear. Documents], Novosibirsk, OGIZ, 1947, pp 69, 179, 222, 257.
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14. Ibid., sheets 755-756, 770, 806, 818.
15. M.I. Stishov, "Bolshevistskoye podpolye i partizanskoye dvizheniye v Sibiri v gody grazhdanskoy voyny (1918-1920 gg.)" [The Bolshevik Underground and Partisan Movement in Siberia During the Years of the Civil War (1918-1920)], Moscow, MGU, 1962, p 302.
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#### 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF MAIN INSPECTORATE NOTED

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[Article by Army Gen V.L. Govorov, Hero of the Soviet Union and USSR Deputy Minister of Defense: "The Superior Control Body of the USSR Ministry of Defense"; the article was written on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the establishing of the Main Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense\* and published under the rubric "Military History Dates"]

[Text] With the organizing of the Worker-Peasant Red Army [RKKA] and the Worker-Peasant Red Navy [RKKF], the questions of monitoring the organization, formation and training of the Army and Navy and all their institutions both at the center and on the spot, assumed important significance. On 24 April 1918, the Higher Military Inspectorate under the chairmanship of N.I. Podvoyskiy was organized as a body of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs and later the RVSr [Revolutionary-Military Council of the Republic]. From April through September 1918, it carried out extensive work to organize a system of local military administration, to reconstitute individual detachments as regular formations and units, to organize political work and a supply system as well as set up and strengthen the operational fronts.

On 16 October 1918, the RVSr approved the Regulation Governing the Higher Military Inspectorate of the RKKA and according to this it was entrusted with the tasks of establishing a mass regular army, monitoring the constituting, training and logistic support of its formations and units as well as facilities and military schools. After the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] approved the Regulation Governing the People's Commissariat of State Control (NKKG), the Higher Military Inspectorate by the Order of the RVSr of 8 September 1919, was disbanded and its personnel employed for establishing a military section of the NKKG and a military and naval inspectorate under the RVSr. In January 1922, this inspectorate became the Inspectorate of the Red Army and Red Navy.

Subsequently, with the centralizing of the military administrative system, in April 1924, the RKKA Inspectorate was established and this included two directorates (for troop training and military schools) and five inspectorates (infantry and preinduction training of workers, cavalry, artillery, engineer troops and signal troops).



On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, the functions of inspecting the troops and testing their combat readiness were carried out by the inspectorates under the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense and headed by the inspector generals of the branches of troops. In particular, there were inspectorates for the infantry, cavalry, artillery, air forces, motor vehicle and armored troops, engineer troops and signal troops. The inspectorates made a major contribution to preparing the nation and the army for war. Due to their activities, the leadership possessed reliable information on the preparedness of the troops for combat operations. Moreover, they worked out specific proposals to improve the organizational structure of the units and formations and for their technical equipping.

The Great Patriotic War required a revision of the tasks confronting the RKKA institution of the inspectorate. On 9 August 1941, the Regulation Governing the Main Directorate for the Organization and Manning of Soviet Army Troops was approved and in this a section for the inspection of new formations was established. In November 1941, the infantry inspectorate was incorporated in this. The other inspectorates basically operated under the leadership of the appropriate deputy people's commissars of defense for the commanders of the branches of troops.

After the war, for inspecting the preparedness and the state of combat training of the troops, the main inspectorates of the Ground Troops, Air Forces and Navy were established.

By the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 17 January 1947, in the aim of improving supervision over the improvement of the Armed Forces, the main inspectorates of the Ground Troops, Air Forces and Navy were transformed into the Main Inspectorate of the Armed Forces headed by the chief inspector who was also a USSR deputy minister of the Armed Forces (now USSR minister of defense).

The Main Inspectorate, as the higher control body of the USSR Ministry of Defense, was entrusted with responsible tasks, including the inspection of the state of the troops, their training and logistic support.

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A special place in the activities of the Main Inspectorate of the Ministry of Defense (GI MO) over all its 40-year history has been held by the inspecting of troop combat readiness, that is, the state determining the degree of preparedness of the Army and Navy to carry out the battle tasks entrusted to them. The combat and political training of the troops is inspected first of all, including field, sea and air skills of the personnel; the strength of the formations, units, ships and subunits in terms of personnel, weapons and combat equipment; the presence of the necessary supplies of materiel; the maintaining of weapons and combat equipment in proper working order and ready for use; the preparedness of the command personnel and staffs; the state of discipline and organization of the personnel as well as vigilance in standing combat alert.



The main task of the Main Inspectorate is to inspect the combat training of the subunits, units and formations of the Armed Services and branches of troops as well as their staffs. During the postwar period this has been carried out considering the experience of the Great Patriotic War and World War II as a whole as well as the changes brought about by the improvement of military equipment and the organizational structure of the troops. In inspecting combat readiness, the chief criterion has been the constant readiness of the Army and Navy personnel to come immediately to the defense of the socialist motherland.

Inspections were conducted annually. In 1957, the formations of six military districts (Far Eastern, Caucasian, Moscow, Odessa, Baltic and Tavrian) and a mechanized army were inspected. The military inspectors checked whether the troop training programs corresponded to the requirements of the times, how the combat experience of the last war was being studied and disseminated and whether the new troop organization was being assimilated. The Report of the Chief Inspector to the Minister of the Armed Forces on the Results of Inspection Activities for that year, in particular, pointed out that the troop training system had certain flaws and required reorganization while the operational training of the commanders and staffs in a number of districts lagged behind the requirements of modern combat. In the conclusion the lesson was drawn that all of this reduced the troop combat readiness.

Having profoundly investigated the real state of affairs, the inspectorate worked out a series of proposals aimed at altering the planning, the methods and organizing of combat training as well as certain provisions of the then extant manuals.

In the postwar years, great importance has been given to inspecting the troops during the conduct of combined-arms tactical exercises and KShU [command-staff exercises] in the field and on maps. Thus, representatives of the Main Inspectorate carefully studied troop actions in the Belorussian (1952) and Carpathian (1953) Military Districts. In the course of the inspection, chief attention was paid to the thoroughness of the study and employment of the previous war's experience.

With the appearance of new weapons and particularly with the arming of the Army and Navy with nuclear weapons, the scope and content of troop combat training have changed fundamentally.

This has required from the collective of the Main Inspectorate a reorganization of the work style and inspection methods as well as the filling out of inspector personnel.

In inspecting the Ground Troops without fail they have inspected and do inspect the state of troop tactical training and the operational training of the staffs of the formations and field forces and their ability to organize and conduct operations employing all types of modern weapons.

At present, tactics has been enriched with many new provisions relating to the conduct of both combined-arms as well as air and sea battles. For this reason, in inspections attention is paid to assimilating the methods: the

assault on combat vehicles; an offensive without a pause moving up troops from the interior; troop actions on individual axes. In assessing the conduct of air combat, great attention is given to the intercepting of enemy aviation, primarily carrier aircraft, by fighters on the approaches to the covered installations and to their destruction; in naval combat attention is paid to the actions of missile submarines, missile ships and missile-carrying aviation, to the joint actions of different fleet forces equipped with different types of weapons and so forth.

Inspections conducted in recent years in a number of districts and fleets have shown that all the questions of combat training by the troops and fleets have been worked out and assimilated sufficiently well. This has been confirmed in the troop exercises and maneuvers such as Dnieper (1967), Dvina and Okean (1970), Kavkaz and Sever (1976) and Karpaty (1977) as well as exercises conducted jointly with the armies of the Warsaw Pact states (Bratstvo po Oruzhiyu [Fraternity in Arms] and Shchit [Shield]).

However, far from all the questions of combat training and combat readiness have been fully resolved. Proceeding from the demands of the times, the generals, admirals and officers of the GI MO are making a great effort to promptly spot the existing shortcomings, to disclose their causes and provide recommendations for rapid eradication. Thus, in inspecting the Baku Air Defense District (1975) instances were discovered of an overstating of the combat training grades as well as shortcomings in organizing the cooperation between the branches of troops. A majority of these was eliminated in the course of the inspection.

A significant part of the time assigned for inspections is employed for checking the individual training of the servicemen and the ability to conduct accurate fire and make maximum use of the regulation weapons and combat equipment.

Since there is a large amount of group weapons in the troops, the inspector personnel goes deeply into the essence of the problems arising in the training of crews and teams, in achieving their teamwork, and inspects the development of interchangeability and the capacity to carry out fire tasks with reduced personnel.

In the course of the inspection they carefully study the conformity of the firing and driving courses and the various regulations to the combat training level achieved by the subunits and units.

In the activities of the GI MO special attention is paid to checking the fulfillment of the decisions of the Soviet government and the USSR Ministry of Defense on the questions of the development and improvement of weapons, combat equipment and their assimilation by the troops. This includes a whole series of areas, starting from supervision over the scientific research and preparation of proposals for introducing (removing) one or another type of weapon and ending with the inspection of the technical training of the Army and Navy personnel. But, regardless of what the inspectors are working on, they are concerned primarily with increasing the combat performance of the weapons and equipment, they analyze their employment in the troops, they draw

conclusions and present the appropriate proposals. Specific measures are taken upon these proposals.

The collective of the Main Inspectorate also contributes to introducing new models of military equipment. The inspectors participate in setting the specifications for the tactical and technical characteristics of types of weapons and combat equipment being designed, they inspect the activities of the scientific research institutes of the Ministry of Defense and are present at testing. Thus, an inspection conducted by them in 1956 showed that along with major advances in developing models of combat equipment and weapons, in the activities of certain scientific research institutions there were definite shortcomings. At times the work was conducted slowly, and as a result of this individual plans were obsolete even in the development stage. The inspectors also drew attention to the necessity of organizing extensive technical information as this would help to improve the quality of work, to determine the prospects for modernizing the equipment and weapons as well as exclude duplication in the activities of the scientific institutions.

The scientific-technical revolution has increased the pace of the material and technical equipping and rearming of the Soviet Army and Navy. Correspondingly there has been an increase in the demands placed on the inspecting of the technical training of the personnel and the state of the weaponry. These questions as well as the readiness of the weapons and equipment for combat employment and the carrying out of measures for reducing the time required to bring the equipment from the fleets and have it combat ready are constantly under the supervision of the inspectors.

An important area in the activities of the Main Inspectorate is the inspecting of the quality state of the personnel in the Army and Navy and the work of military schools in training officers.

In defining the party's cadre policy, V.I. Lenin said that we need "people who are not only...dedicated but people who are actually educated...."(1) Due to the concern of the Communist Party, the command, the political and the engineer-technical personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces meet these high demands and unstintingly carry out their military duty. Inspections of the state of the personnel and the degree of their preparedness are conducted both in military schools as well as directly in the troops. When an inspection of the Odessa and Baltic Military Districts (1947) showed that many officers had poor theoretical and special training, the inspectorate recommended that the senior officer personnel which had undergone accelerated training be retrained in the Vystrel [Shot] courses and in courses for the advanced training of supervisory personnel under the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze, while the company and platoon commanders which did not have military training on the level of a complete infantry school course would receive training in courses for the advance training of officers in the districts.

In 1968, the organization of the educational process was inspected in the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze, the Military Artillery Academy imeni M.I. Kalinin and the Military Communications Academy imeni MSU S.M. Budennyi. The results of this showed that not only the content but also the forms and methods of instruction and indoctrination for the officers had been brought as

close as possible to the conditions and requirements of troop reality. It was pointed out that in these institutions of learning, great attention has been given to independent study of the achievements of military science, to working out course and diploma projects, to carrying out individual assignments, while sufficient time has been assigned to practical exercises involving weapons and military equipment, to troop practice, military scientific work and so forth.

In inspecting military schools, the inspectors also pointed to a number of shortcomings. For example, in the 1956 inspection of the Directorate of Naval Schools it was pointed out that the exercises and drills with the officer candidates were carried out in an insufficiently organized manner and the officer candidates were not gaining practical skills in mastering the weapons and equipment. Actual sea voyages were conducted only from May through September and this reduced the quality of officer candidate training.

Thus, the military inspectors constantly monitor how the curricula of the military schools conform to the needs of the times so that the organization of the training process contributes a maximum to the training of highly skilled officer personnel.

Great attention is given by the inspectors to checking the professional growth of the officers in the troops. For this purpose, in inspecting, they supervise the planning, organization and methods of commander training, the instruction-procedural assemblies and exercises. They analyze how well the officers are prepared for exercising their functional duties, for leading the subunits and units, they disclose shortcomings and provide recommendations to eliminate them.

A great deal of attention is given to inspecting the logistic and routine support for the troops. The experience of the Great Patriotic War convincingly showed the importance of the early establishing of supplies of materiel. For this reason, in inspecting the formations and field forces, particular attention is given to the work of the organic rear services, including the dumps with supplies of materiel, motor transport, repair, medical and other units and subunits. Here they inspect the correct storage of supplies and their safekeeping, the degree of providing the subunits with everything necessary for combat actions and daily life as well as routine repairs on the weapons and combat equipment and the possibility of their evacuation. They also carefully study the questions of the evacuation of sick and wounded from the battlefield, the ways for restoring troop battleworthiness and the state of the everyday living conditions of the servicemen.

We have taken up only certain questions which come under the supervision of the GI MO. In addition to these, its competence also includes inspecting the preparation of reserves for the Armed Forces, the activities and quality of work done by the central institutions of the Ministry of Defense, the organizational development and improvement of our Army and other questions. Troop inspections are conducted in accord with a plan approved by the minister of defense. A report is presented on the results with proposals to eliminate the detected shortcomings and when necessary also a draft order.

The existing organizational structure of the GI MO makes it possible to thoroughly investigate any problems in the development and improvement of the Soviet Armed Forces. Moreover, when necessary specialists may be called in to inspect the troops on one or another question as well as support equipment from the central directorates of the Ministry of Defense, the staffs of the Armed Services and branches of troops and military schools.

Presently, the GI MO is staffed with highly skilled and experienced specialists who are capable not only of resolving the questions of troop inspection but also providing the necessary help to the commanders, to the political workers and to the staffs directly upon inspection.

As a rule, upon the completion of each inspection, an analysis is made of it and to this they invite the leadership of the formations from the inspected district, troop group or fleet.

The questions examined by us of the activities of the GI MO over the 40 years indicate that its work has played a very important role in the overall system of troop command. During the inspections, including at tactical and command-staff exercises and maneuvers, the nature of modern combat or an operation is most fully disclosed and the degree of troop combat training and combat readiness is apparent. The inspection provides an opportunity to test out in practice the provisions of manuals, the capabilities of weapons and combat equipment as well as bring out new methods for conducting battle and various tactical and technical standards.

The 27th CPSU Congress has posed complex and responsible tasks for the Soviet Armed Forces. They must constantly show high vigilance and be ready to thwart the intrigues of imperialism against the USSR and its allies. The high quality execution of the tasks and plans for operational and combat training in 1986 was a specific response by the men of the Army and Navy to the historic congress decisions. As an inspection has shown, the troops have done much to further improve field, air and sea skills and to bring the training of the troops and naval forces as close as possible to the conditions of combat reality.

However, at present it is particularly important to have a self-criticalness on the part of the leadership, a realism in assessing the achieved level of combat training, field skills, discipline and the moral-political state of the formations and units and a creative search for new approaches to achieving high skill and effectiveness of command. Our times are a time of strict judgments. These words assume particular meaning for us now when the Soviet military is struggle to successfully carry out the 1987 plans and programs on the tactical exercise fields, in the air space and on the seas and oceans.

During the celebrating of its 40th anniversary, the Main Military Inspectorate is carrying out new tasks in checking the combat readiness of the units, formations and field forces of the Armed Forces. To learn to work in a new manner, to painlessly give up what is obsolete, to abandon an inertia of thought, customary ideas and routine are an urgent imperative of our times. The staff of the Main Military Inspectorate is endeavoring to work in this style. Of course, in its practical activity it uses the rich experience



gained by its collective in previous years when it was headed by the well known Soviet military leaders L.A. Govorov, I.S. Konev, M.S. Malinin, M.V. Zakharov, I.Kh. Bagramyan, I.Ye. Petrov, K.K. Rokossovskiy and K.S. Moskalenko.

#### FOOTNOTES

\*Inspector bodies have a rich history. In Russia, they were established by Peter I for supervising the state and training of the troops, for periodic inspection of the troop economy and the logistic support of the Army and Navy. Troop inspections have been conducted regularly in Russia since 1731, when the positions of inspector general and military inspectors were established and the duties of which included the inspecting of the troops twice a year. At the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th Centuries, there were 14 military inspectorates in Russia. In the 19th Century, inspector departments of the military and naval ministries were organized.

Before the start of World War I in the Central Military Directorate there were inspector generals directly subordinate to the defense minister as well as inspectors working in the military districts and corps.

The troops were checked chiefly by inspection reviews which were conducted in the spring and autumn without warning.

1. V.I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 45, p 105.

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#### DOSA AF 60TH ANNIVERSARY NOTED

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[Article by Flt Adm G.M. Yegorov, Hero of the Soviet Union and chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee: "A Dependable Assistant of the Soviet Armed Forces (On the 60th Anniversary of the USSR DOSAAF)"]

[Text] The increased combat readiness of the Armed Forces and the indoctrination of the men and all Soviet people in a spirit of vigilance, readiness to defend the motherland and the victories of socialism are important tasks for the party and the state.

A definite contribution to the strengthening of national defense capability, to preparing the workers and particularly the youth to defend the socialist fatherland has been made by the All-Union Volunteer Society for Assisting the Army, Aviation and Navy, USSR DOSAAF.

The history of DOSAAF is inseparably linked with the legacy of V.I. Lenin in organizing Vseovobuch [Universal Military Training], to the names of M.V. Frunze, K.Ye. Voroshilov, S.M. Budenny and R.P. Eydeman. In the 1920s, under the leadership of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] a series of defense organizations was set up in the nation on volunteer lines. On 23 January 1927, delegates of the First All-Union Congress of Aviakhim [Assistance to Aviation and Chemical Industry] and participants in the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Society for Assisting Defense at a joint session adopted a decision to unite both societies into one, the "Union of Societies of Friends of Defense and the Aviation-Chemical Construction of the USSR," abbreviated as Osoaviakhim.

In March 1928, the party Central Committee approved the Decree "On the Work of Osoaviakhim," and this set out the tasks of this organization over the long run. Under the leadership of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, Osoaviakhim made a worthy contribution to preparing military personnel including: pilots, parachutists, snipers, signal troops, motor vehicle troops, sailors and other specialists.

Along with the Lenin Komsomol, Osoaviakhim helped the party organize and develop the Air Forces and Navy of the Soviet nation. Upon the appeal of the

9th Komsomol Congress held in January 1931, "Komsomol Member to the Aircraft!" thousands of young persons expressed a desire to go into aviation. The network of aviation circles, glider stations and air clubs was enlarged and here the young men and women without leaving their jobs mastered flying. Among them were the future thrice Heroes of the Soviet Union, MSUs Avn A. Pokryshkin and I. Kozhedub, Heroes of the Soviet Union A. Maresyev, M. Chechnev, I. Dzusev and many others.

The Osoaviakhim organizations also carried out the training and retraining of naval specialists. Upon a Komsomol assignment, having received basic training in Osoaviakhim, A. Shabalin, subsequently twice Hero of the Soviet Union, V. Alekseyev and G. Shchedrin who became Heroes of the Soviet Union and others came to serve in the Navy.

Under the conditions of preparing to rebuff imperialist aggression, the main tasks of the society were set out in the Decree of the VKP(b) Central Committee and the USSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars] "On Osoaviakhim" of 8 August 1935. In carrying out the party's ideas, the defense society strengthened its work. Of great importance was the mass passing organized by it of the standards for the insignias "Ready for Labor and Defense" (GTO), "Ready for Air and Chemical Defense" (PVKhO), "Ready for Medical Defense" (GSO), Voroshilov Marksmen, Voroshilov Horsemen, Young Sailor, Young Aviation Builder and others. As a result in the prewar years, millions of marksmen were trained and over 38 million persons learned the rules of PVKhO.(1)

The knowledge and skills obtained in Osoaviakhim helped the Soviet people act skillfully on the battlefields against the Nazi invaders during the years of the Great Patriotic War. Indicatively, even in the first months of the war, over one-half the membership of Osoaviakhim, 7.2 million persons, left for the front by mobilization or by volunteering.(2) Many of them, having basic military and military-technical training, were immediately incorporated in units of the operational army.

Osoaviakhim took an active part in preparing reserves for the front as well as in organizing units and formations of the people's militia, hunter and worker volunteer battalions and fighters of the MPVO or local air defense. In the course of the war its organizations (at enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhoses) without leaving the job trained marksmen, snipers, machine gunners, signal troops, motor vehicle drivers and parachutists.

During the war years, Osoaviakhim took an active part in organizing Vsevoluch which covered around 10 million persons.(3) The training of specialist soldiers in the Society's training organizations was significantly widened.

The Osoaviakhim members showed high moral-political and combat qualities as well as organizational abilities in combat. Becoming Heroes of the Soviet Union were the division commander, Maj Gen S. Rakhimov; the submariners V. Starikov, M. Gadzhiyev, V. Konovalov and M. Greshilov; the snipers L. Pavlichenko and V. Pchelintsev; the squad commander, Sgt Ya. Pavlov; the medical instructor, MSgt M. Shcherbachenko and many other graduates of the defense society. Of the more than 2,000 military pilots who received the .pa

title of Hero of the Soviet Union in the war years, around one-half gained their basic military training in the Osoaviakhim air clubs.(4)

In the course of the war the movement to create the nation's defense fund assumed a truly popular character. With money collected by Osoaviakhim, 19 squadrons and flights of combat aircraft, 20 tank columns and several fighting ships were built and turned over to the Soviet Army.(5) In 1947, the Society received the Order of the Red Banner for services in strengthening national defense on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of its formation.

The traditions of Osoaviakhim have been continued by the USSR DOSAAF. The fundamental changes which occurred in the 1950s in the technical arming of the Army and Navy determined its tasks.

The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers of 7 May 1966 "On the State and Measures to Improve the Work of the All-Union Volunteer Society for Assisting the Army, Aviation and Navy (USSR DOSAAF)" was the underlying document which became a program of activity for the defense society for a protracted period. In carrying out the party and government instructions, the DOSAAF committees and training organizations have steadily improved their military-patriotic, mass defense and sports work and have strengthened the training facilities. By the beginning of the 1970s, the setting up of a network of DOSAAF schools and air clubs throughout the nation was basically completed, and the scale of training personnel for the mass technical professions for the national economy and having paramilitary importance had grown.

The motherland has highly praised the contributions of DOSAAF to developing mass defense work and preparing the workers to defend the socialist fatherland, having received the Order of Lenin in January 1977.

An important stage in the life of DOSAAF was the 9th All-Union DOSAAF Congress held in February 1983. Its delegates and all members of the multimillion Society welcomed enthusiastically the greetings of the CPSU Central Committee to the congress which, in particular, stated: "The duty of the DOSAAF organizations is to improve mass defense work, military patriotic indoctrination and the propagandizing of military knowledge among the population. They should improve the quality of specialist training for the Armed Forces and personnel for the mass technical professions for the national economy and ensure the further development of technical and paramilitary types of sports."(6)

At present, DOSAAF is one of the most mass social organizations of the country. In its ranks are over 107 million persons. There is virtually no large labor or educational collective where a defense organization is not in operation.

With pride for our great motherland and the Leninist party, the DOSAAF members have welcomed the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the new version of the CPSU Program that "each communist, each Soviet person is obliged to do everything within his power to maintain the nation's defense capability on a proper level."(7)

In the course of the socialist competitions to honorably greet the party congress and to carry out the tasks stemming from its decisions, many collectives of the defense society have increased their activeness. The DOSAAF organizations of Belorussia, the Ukraine, Moscow, Bryansk, Kuybyshev and Omsk Oblasts and Krasnoyarsk Kray are working in a most planned and effective manner.

Good results have been achieved by many primary collectives of the Society. For example, in Estonia the primary DOSAAF organization of the Fishing Kolkhoz imeni S.M. Kirov has a good score. Here is one of the best facilities of the Society in the republic. There are seven sections just for the technical and paramilitary types of sports. Here the young people can participate in shooting, motorboat and automotive sports, applied military all-round tournament and snorkeling. A radio club has also been organized. The kolkhoz shortwave sportsmen are republic champions and have successfully competed in the USSR championship. Here they solemnly escort the young kolkhoz members into the army and after service they, as a rule, return home. There are more and more such primary DOSAAF collectives where the sports and technical clubs and circles work beneficially. Among these are the organizations of the Sovkhoz imeni 60-letiya SSSR in Bryansk Oblast, the Minsk Gorizont Production Association, the Kaunas Polytechnical Institute, the Tashkent Aviation Association imeni V.P. Chkalov and many others.

In recent years significant work has been done to strengthen all the leading DOSAAF bodies. Over 7 million persons are conducting mass defense work on volunteer principles and 60 percent of the activists are participants in the Great Patriotic War and veterans of the Army and Navy.

The new version of the CPSU Program adopted at the 27th Party Congress has pointed out that an important task of ideological indoctrination is military patriotic indoctrination and the shaping of a readiness to defend the socialist fatherland, to dedicate all ones forces to it and, if need be, one's life.(8) The indoctrination of the DOSAAF members in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and internationalism, high political vigilance and a constant readiness to defend the socialist fatherland is the most important area in the activities of the defense society. Practice has shown the effectiveness of such forms of military patriotic work as Lenin and sociopolitical readings, universities and clubs of the future soldier, lecture cycles, rallies of draftees, lessons of courage and meetings with veterans.

In the military patriotic indoctrination of the youth an important role is played by sponsorship ties of the defense collectives with troop units, ships and border outposts. Many DOSAAF committees, schools and clubs regularly organize meetings with servicemen on leave including soldiers, sailors and officers. The DOSAAF members and servicemen jointly hold sports competitions and hikes to sites of battles of the Great Patriotic War.

The DOSAAF collectives also participate in the All-Union Memory Watch and in the Week of Revolutionary Glory, in youth hikes to the sites of revolutionary, military and labor glory, the prospecting expeditions of the "Chronicle of the

Great Patriotic War" as well as the military sports games Zernitsa [Summer Lightning] and Orlenok [Eaglet].

Under the effect of the overall rise in indoctrinational work in the Society, the role of the DOSAAF periodic press has been significantly strengthened as a collective propagandist and organizer of the masses. The society publishes the newspaper SOVETSKIY PATRIOT as well as the journals VOYENNYE ZNANIYA, KRYLYA RODINY, ZA RUBLEM and RADIO. In the Ukraine, the newspaper PATRIOT BALKUVSHCHINY is published and the magazine SPARNAY in Lithuania.

Each year DOSAAF publishes 240-250 titles of books and artistic products with a total run of 25 million copies and releases 4-6 military patriotic films.

The indoctrination of the DOSAAF members in a spirit of socialist internationalism holds an important place in the military patriotic work. The USSR DOSAAF collaborates with the defense and sports organizations of the socialist states as well as with those of Syria, Mozambique and South Yemen in mass defense and sports work. The exchange of delegations and sports meets have become regular, and camps have been opened for preinduction youth operating under the motto "For Fraternity and Friendship!" In honor of the 40th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany, on the territory of the European socialist countries, an international motor rally "Pobeda-40" [Victory-40] has been organized in which representatives of 10 fraternal defense organizations participated. Thousands of persons were present at meetings, friendly encounters as well as in laying wreaths on monuments and obelisks along the route. The rally ended with a great meeting in the Berlin Treptow Park.

The training of youth for service in the Soviet Army and Navy is a practical contribution of DOSAAF to strengthening the combat potential of the USSR Armed Forces. More than one-third of the inductees have learned military specialties in the DOSAAF training organizations. In the DOSAAF motor vehicle, unified technical, radio engineering and naval schools and air clubs the young men study the military oath and regulations, they become acquainted with the way of Army and Navy service and gain knowledge and skills in their selected military specialty.

Since 1985, for improving the military vocational guidance of the young men and for preparing them to enter Air Forces schools, the DOSAAF sports and aviation organizations have been teaching flying and parachuting to young men of, respectively, 16 and 15 years of age.

The DOSAAF schools and air clubs give great attention to the ideological tempering of the students and to their heroic-patriotic indoctrination. A 30-hour program of political exercises has been established in the training organizations.

Upon a decision of the Bureau of the Presidium of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, heroes of war and labor are enrolled on the rosters of the DOSAAF training organizations and prizes have been instituted in their honor for awarding upon the results of the socialist competition of the training groups.



The DOSAAF schools keep honor books and journals of the history of the training organizations.

The DOSAAF committees and the workers of the schools and clubs work constantly to improve the skills of specialists for the Army and Navy, paying special attention to preparing draftees for the high moral and psychological stresses and training them to skillfully master modern weapons and combat equipment. The physical plant of the Bryansk United Technical DOSAAF School has been improved considering these demands. Here they have a motor vehicle driving range (both for motor vehicles and for armored personnel carriers). From the command post they can operate elements which create difficult situations for the students. This makes it possible for the future military drivers to gain firm skills in driving the motor vehicle and not become confused under emergency conditions. Future sailors gain good training in the Khmelnitskiy, Kiev and Tashkent Naval Schools and future pilots do the same in the Moscow air clubs which have been the initiators of training young youth.

The DOSAAF has made a major contribution to forming technically trained reserves for the Armed Forces by taking an active part in preparing for the national economy personnel of the mass technical professions which are of applied military importance. Each year DOSAAF trains over 2 million specialists for the national economy (in 75 professions) and they are successfully working on the BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline] on the Tyumen Oil Fields and industrial enterprises, construction projects and in the nation's agriculture. The DOSAAF training organizations train over 50 percent of the drivers of all types of motor transport in the nation.

Of great importance is the development of the technical and paramilitary types of sports. The direction of DOSAAF activities in this area has been determined by the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers "On Further Raising the Mass Participation in Physical Culture and Sports." Presently, over 11 million persons, chiefly the youth, are studying technical and paramilitary types of sports in the nation. The athletic mastery of the DOSAAF athletes is growing year by year. During the years of the 11th Five-Year Plan, at international meets they won over 2,810 medals, one-half of which were gold. The nation's sports honor has been successfully defended by V. Smolin, Yu. Ivanov, L. Nemkova, Kh. Makogonova, M. Dobrancheva, A. Ishutin, V. Chistyakov, S. Koshkina, D. Oleynikov, S. Kireyeva, G. Kalistratov, I. Nelevskiy, S. Pyzhyanov, A. Golovin and many others.

At world and European championships in 1985-1986, DOSAAF athletes won first places for aerobatics, parachuting, diving, motorboat, radio and shooting sports as well as motorball. Ice-racing motorcyclists have achieved great results. Our pilots have demonstrated great skill in performances in Australia, France, Sweden and Finland where they had been invited by local sports organizations.

Over 3,500 technical sports clubs have been organized in the primary DOSAAF organizations. These have a positive effect upon the development of the



technical and paramilitary types of sports directly in the labor collectives. The children and youth technical sports schools (DYuSTSh) are gaining ever-greater popularity and these have been set up jointly by the DOSAAF committees and the trade unions. Over 100,000 young men and women are studying in the DYuSTSh.

Over the 6 decades, millions of Soviet people have gone through the DOSAAF school. In their ranks were veterans who fought courageously on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War and soldiers who have excelled in our days. Among the Heroes of the Soviet Union who received this high title for courage and heroism shown in carrying out their international duty in Afghanistan are the officers V. Shcherbakov, A. Chernozhukov, N. Akramov, Yu. Kuznetsov and Sgt I. Chmurov.

Sgt A. Novak has received the Order of Lenin and many other soldiers who are graduates of our schools and clubs have been awarded state decorations.

The graduate of the Saratov Air Club, Yuriy Alekseyevich Gagarin, and many other cosmonauts proudly call themselves DOSAAF offspring. In speaking at the Ninth All-Union Congress, the USSR pilot-cosmonaut and now twice Hero of the Soviet Union S. Savitskaya said that she considers herself to have an unpaid debt to her mentors and teachers and to all the defense society.

Boldness and skill have been shown by DOSAAF graduates including drivers in eliminating the consequences of natural disasters in Moldavia, Transcaucasia, in the Far East and Central Asia.

DOSAAF members showed great courage and the ability to act efficiently under emergency conditions in eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Plant.

The Pripjat gorkom and the Chernobyl raykom of the DOSAAF (chairman, A. Chetkov and S. Umanev, respectively) upon assignment of the party and soviet bodies during the first days after the accident, along with other organizations, successfully evacuated the population from a number of the microrayons. The Kiev DOSAAF obkom (chairman, E. Lakomov) skillfully directed the actions of the committees, the training and sports organizations of the Society in the rayons in the threatened zone. The graduates of the defense Society showed up well, including motor vehicle drivers, helicopter pilots, bulldozer operators and other specialists. Subsequently, the DOSAAF committees organized mass defense, military-patriotic and sports work in the collectives evacuated from the Chernobyl area.

In celebrating their jubilee, the workers, activists and committees of DOSAAF are focusing their efforts primarily on the unsolved problems and on mobilizing reserves for further improving DOSAAF activities. The Fifth Plenum of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee held in April 1986, having assessed what had been achieved from the standpoint of the 27th CPSU Congress, pointed out that there are substantial shortcomings in the work of many collectives, primary, training and sports organizations and enterprises of DOSAAF.

In light of the party congress demands, tasks were defined for eliminating bureaucracy and formalism, excessive paper work, excessive busyness and measures were outlined to improve the recruitment and placement of personnel, and to strengthen control over the fulfillment of the taken decisions and obligations and orders as well as the rational and thrifty use of equipment and facilities.

The DOSAAF committees, schools and clubs as well as primary organizations have much to do to carry out the demands of the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on preparing youth for military service. At present, this is one of the main areas for revising the work of the DOSAAF organizations.

An important condition for success in the activity of the DOSAAF organizations is a comprehensive approach to organizing mass defense work carried out under the leadership of the party and soviet bodies. Practice shows that high and stable results are achieved where strong professional contacts are established between the DOSAAF and Komsomol committees, the bodies of public and vocational-technical education, the civil defense staffs, the organizations of the Znaniye [Knowledge] Society, the sections of the Soviet War Veterans Committee, the military commissariats, troop units and subunits.

A major reserve for improving DOSAAF activities in the process of reorganization can be seen in the greatest possible development of amateur independent activities and the wide involvement of the DOSAAF members in active work. In strengthening the training facilities of the defense collectives, it is essential to make better use of what we have available in the form of clubs, stadiums, shooting ranges, swimming pools, driving ranges and much else. Precisely the DOSAAF committees must be the initiators of the movement to build simple sports areas in residential areas and together with the trade unions and Komsomol organize sports clubs on cooperative lines.

The main thing at present is to develop exactingness and self-criticism, professionalism and mutual exactingness in the DOSAAF collectives. The DOSAAF committees and millions of members see their duty in making the defense society in the future a dependable assistant and reserve for the Armed Forces as well as making a proper contribution to improving military patriotic indoctrination of the youth, preparing them for service in the Army and Navy and further strengthening the defense might of the socialist fatherland.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Dvazhdy ordenonosnoye oboronnoye" [Twice Order-Winning Defense Society], Moscow, Izd-vo DOSAAF SSSR, 1983, p 81.
2. Ibid., p 104.
3. Ibid., p 148.
4. Ibid., p 127.
5. Ibid., p 120.

6. PRAVDA, 7 February 1983.
7. "Materialy XXVII syezda KPSS" [Materials of the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1986, p 161.
8. Ibid., p 165.

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ARMY COMMANDER 2D RANK YA. I. ALKSNIS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 87 (signed to press 23 Dec 86) pp 87-89

[Article by Mar Avn G.P. Skorikov; the article was written on the occasion of the 90th birthday of Ya.I. Alksnis]

[Text] The establishment and rapid development of Soviet aviation during the prewar years are inseparably linked with the name of the prominent military leader, talented organizer and ardent Bolshevik, Army Commander 2d Rank Yakov Ivanovich Alksnis.

Yakov Ivanovich Alksnis was born on 26 (14) January 1897 at Pakuli Farm in Naukshenskiy Volost of Valmiyerskiy Rayon in a family of a landless farm worker. He early on learned need and hard work. Even at the age of 7, Yakov worked as a herdsboy. When the boy reached 9, his parents sent him off to study.

In 1913, after completing the parish church school, the young man successfully passed entrance exams and was admitted to the Valmier Teacher Seminary. There he set out on the path of revolutionary struggle. In September 1916, Alksnis joined the Social Democratic Party of Latvia which was a territorial organization of the Bolshevik Party.

1917 came. Because of the continuing World War I, the students from the last year were graduated from the seminary ahead of time and inducted into military service. Yakov Alksnis along with a group of young teachers was sent to study in the Odessa Military Infantry School. In August 1917, after 4 months of instruction, the young warrant officer ["praporshchik"] received assignment to the 15th Siberian Reserve Regiment stationed in Achinsk. However, in the regiment for his revolutionary views he was soon considered unreliable and sent to the Western Front to the 7th Turkestan Division. Arriving there on the eve of the October Revolution, Alksnis began conducting agitation and propaganda among the soldiers and later took an active part in organizing soldier committees.

After the passage of the Peace Decree, Yakov returned to Valmier and began working to strengthen Soviet power in Latvia. However, the truce was not long. In February 1918, the German Army occupied his motherland. Many who

were loyal to the cause of the revolution and the party to avoid arrest were forced to leave for Soviet Russia. Alksnis left the city along with the Valmier revolutionaries. He worked for some time as the head of the Finance Section of the Bryansk Executive Committee and at the same time headed the Board for Prisoner and Refugee Affairs (Plenbezh). In the autumn of 1918, Yakov Ivanovich was assigned to organize the state control apparatus or "Worker-Peasant Inspectorate," and the Bryansk Bolsheviks elected him a member of the district party committee and chairman of the Latvian section.

During this period, the situation in the country was complex. Enemies surrounded the young Soviet republic on all sides. In the east there was the fight against Kolchak, and Denikin was advancing from the south. In May 1919, Alksnis joined the Worker-Peasant Red Army [RKKA]. Initially he was appointed commissar of the staff of the Orel Military Commissariat and a month later, the military commissar of Orel Province. Regardless of the heroic resistance of the Red Army, the troops of Gen Denikin continued to advance on Moscow, and on 24 August marshal law was declared in Orel Province. In order to check the enemy and mobilize the forces to further struggle, the Orel Fortified Area was established. It was headed by a military council and Alksnis was a member of this. The fortified area did not exist long as in September Denikin's troops occupied Kursk and a direct threat arose to Orel. By an order of the military council, the fortified area was eliminated. Out of the individual troop units comprising it, the 55th Rifle Division was constituted to defend the city. Alksnis was appointed the division's commissar and in its ranks he participated in the fighting against Denikin.

The situation on the front grew more and more tense. For this reason by an order of the Red Army Command, the External Southern Defensive Area (chief, P.K. Shcherbakov) was rapidly organized. Ya.I. Alksnis was appointed the chief of supply. But, regardless of the resistance put up, the troops of the "Volunteer" Army succeeded in taking Orel on 13 October. However, several days later the Red Army liberated the city.

During the period of the defeat of the retreating enemy in the Don Steppes, Yakov Alksnis became the military commissar of Don Oblast. At the end of military operations in the spring of 1920, he returned to Orel and was appointed deputy commander of the Orel Military District for operational and drilling affairs.

During the war years, Ya.I. Alksnis gained great combat experience but lacked theoretical knowledge. For this reason, in August 1921, the command sent him to study at the RKKA Military Academy which he completed in 1924. Over the following 2 years, Yakov Ivanovich held the position of deputy chief of the Organizational-Mobilizational Directorate of the RKKA Staff, the chief and commissar of the Section for the Billeting of Troops of the RKKA Staff and the chief of the Directorate of Troop Billeting of the RKKA Main Directorate. In all posts he worked unstintingly and at full force.

In August 1926, the party, considering the high organizational abilities of Alksnis, sent him to a new work area. He was appointed the deputy chief of the Directorate of the Air Forces of the RKKA. During this period, our aviation industry had already abandoned the copying of captured and licensed

models and was reorganizing to produce domestic aircraft, engines and equipment. The Air Forces Directorate was to play the determining role in this matter.

Soon thereafter the air units began receiving the I-3 fighters and R-5 reconnaissance planes designed by N.N. Polikarpov and the TB-1 bombers designed by A.N. Tupolev. More advanced types of combat aircraft (R-5 and TB-3) were being prepared for series production. Organizing the training for the flight and technical personnel to operate these aircraft rested on the shoulders of Ya.I. Alksnis. But first of all Yakov Ivanovich himself studied the new aviation equipment, he mastered piloting and began flying all types of aircraft. This was an exceptional phenomenon, that is, a combined-arms commander became outstanding pilot. In July 1929, he together with the pilot V.O. Pisarenko in a R-5 aircraft made a test flight along the route of Moscow—Sevastopol and back, and in November he was awarded the skill of military pilot.

In June 1931, Yakov Ivanovich was appointed a member of the USSR RVS [Revolutionary-Military Council] and chief of the RKKA Air Forces Directorate. It was precisely in this position that he most fully evidenced his unusual abilities. Many important measures in improving the organizational structure and operational-tactical training of the Air Forces are linked with Alksnis' name. Upon his initiative compulsory periodic inspections of piloting techniques, preflight training of crews were introduced, instrument flights began to be introduced and the aviation-engineer and navigator services began to be organized.

Yakov Ivanovich became one of the initiators in training flight personnel and parachutists in the Osoaviakhim [Union of Societies for Defense and Aviation-Chemical Construction of the USSR] organizations. In 1932, he submitted for review by the USSR RVS a proposal on celebrating USSR Air Forces Day. This was supported and the Council of People's Commissars ruled that this day would be celebrated annually in August. The first aviation holiday was held on 18 August 1933 in Tushino.

Being a member of the governmental commission established in 1936 for organizing transoceanic flights, Alksnis took an active part in organizing flights to the Arctic, to the North Pole as well as the outstanding flights by the crews of V.P. Chkalov and M.M. Gromov to the United States. In January 1937, he was appointed the USSR deputy people's commissar of defense for aviation.

Yakov Ivanovich headed Soviet aviation for 11 years. During this time he was able not only to put together a collective of aviators but also ably directed its efforts to mastering new aviation equipment, combating accidents and increasing the theoretical level and flight skills. Demanding on himself and his subordinates, sensitive and responsive, the chief of the Air Forces Directorate had unassailable authority. His implacability toward shortcomings, his ability to instill order in all areas of life and activity of the units were a guide which the aviation commanders endeavored to equal.



The Soviet government had high regard for the accomplishments of Ya.I. Alksnis. For courage and heroism shown on the front during the years of the Civil War and for fruitful activity to strengthen the nation's defense capability he was awarded the Orders of Lenin, the Red Banner and Red Star and was given the military rank of Army Commander 2d Rank. He was elected a delegate to the 17th VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Congress and a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet, First Sitting.

For many pilots of the older generation, memories of one's first steps into the sky are linked with the name of Yakov Ivanovich Alksnis. The prominent Soviet military leader, Hero of the Soviet Union, Mar Avn S.A. Krasovskiy thus recalled this remarkable man: "I repeatedly enriched my knowledge in attending as a brigade commander and subsequently a corps commander the analyses of exercises conducted by Alksnis. Yakov Ivanovich Alksnis has remained in my memory as a mentor and a friend of Soviet military aviators."(1)

And today, when Soviet aviators, in improving their professional skills, are confidently storming the distances beyond the clouds, we recall with respect and gratitude Yakov Ivanovich Alksnis, a prominent military aviation chief, a loyal Leninist communist who did so much for making our motherland a great air power.

#### FOOTNOTE

1. "Komandarm krylatykh. Sbornik vospominaniy" [Army Commander of the Winged. Collection of Memoirs], Riga, Liyesma, 1967, p 58.

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